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LIFTING THE FOG:  FINDING A CLEAR 
STANDARD OF LIABILITY FOR SECONDARY 
ACTORS UNDER RULE 10B-5† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In its first six years as a publicly traded company, Cascade reported 
impressive gains and profits.1  But in August 1991, rumors began to 
circulate that Cascade’s remarkable profits might be questionable.2  By 
January of 1992, Cascade’s CEO had gone missing, Cascade had declared 
bankruptcy, and the company faced a class action from its shareholders.3  
The ensuing lawsuit not only went after Cascade’s CEO, but alleged 
securities fraud against Cascade’s attorneys and auditors as well.4 
The trouble had begun five months earlier when Cascade had 
employed an accounting firm to audit two of Cascade’s largest 
subsidiaries.5  During its audits, the accountants found that both entities 
                                                 
†  Winner of the 2006 Valparaiso University Law Review’s Scribes Award. 
1 Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2001).  In December 1985, 
Cascade, a women’s clothing manufacturer, acquired six fashion boutique stores and in 
February 1989, acquired two store chains, Diana and Allison, in which Cascade planned to 
sell its cosmetics.  In re Cascade Int’l Sec. Litig., 840 F. Supp. 1558, 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1993).  
From 1989-1991, Cascade reported record revenues and substantial financial growth in its 
SEC filings, press releases, and other public documents as its stock sales continued to 
increase.  Id. 
2 Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1198.  A month earlier, on August 20, 1991, the SEC had written to 
Cascade’s President and CEO, Victor Incendy, warning that it was reviewing transactions 
made by Cascade and requested numerous documents, including a list of all stores and 
cosmetic counters operated by Cascade.  Id.  Additionally, in October, 1991, “the 
Overpriced Stock Service (“OSS”) issued a report on Cascade, in which it stated that ‘the 
odds of trouble ahead’ were ‘high.’”  Id.  But, even after two class action suits were filed, 
Cascade maintained that there were “no negative developments” in its operations and that 
the suits were “without merit.”  Id. 
3 Id.  The court noted that a January 1992 SEC filing revealed assets of  $8 million and 
liabilities of $14.5 million, in contrast to the figures in Cascade’s 1991 10-K which held out 
assets of $65.9 million and liabilities of $17.3 million.  Id.  Also, Cascade had $6.8 million 
more outstanding shares of common stock than what was reported.  In re Cascade, 840 F. 
Supp. at 1573.  “According to a bankruptcy examiner’s report and recommendations, the 
entire Jean Cosmetic division was nonexistent, the losses of the apparel division and Jean 
Cosmetics were known to Cascade’s management as early as 1989 and Fran’s, Swim’ N 
Sport and J.B. Boutiques were all operating at a loss.”  Id. 
4 Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1197.  The complaint alleged violations of § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Id.  See also infra Part II.A (discussing § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 of the Exchange Act). 
5 Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1199-1200.  The accountants had been hired to audit Fran’s 
Fashions’ consolidated balance sheet and its consolidated statement of operations for the 
fiscal year that ended June 29, 1991.  Id. at 1200.  After they were finished with their audit, 
the accountants issued an audit opinion asserting it had conducted its audit in accordance 
with GAAS.  Id.  However, plaintiffs alleged that the accountants had violated numerous 
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were suffering tremendous losses; in fact, the subsidiaries were in dire 
need of immediate funds from Cascade.6  But when Cascade’s 10-K7 was 
released, the accountants learned that Cascade had failed to report the 
financial troubles of its subsidiaries,8 yet they continued to reaffirm 
Cascade’s financial well-being.9   
Moreover, while the accountants knew of Cascade’s trouble and 
remained silent, Cascade’s attorneys took affirmative steps to improve 
Cascade’s public image.10  Specifically, when questions arose about 
Cascade, the attorneys prepared suggested statements for Cascade’s 
CEO to issue to the public to explain Cascade’s recent stock price 
decline.11  One attorney even urged stock analysts to stop spreading 
rumors about Cascade and to stop advising people to sell the stock 
short.12   
                                                                                                             
standards of the American Institute for Certified Public Accountants.  Id.  Plaintiffs alleged 
that the accounting firm did not “maintain an independence in mental attitude when 
conducting the audit; did not exercise due professional care in the performance of the 
examination and preparation of the report; did not obtain sufficient competent evidence to 
afford a reasonable basis for its audit opinion; and did not make reasonably adequate 
informative disclosures.”  Id. 
6 Id. at 1200.  The plaintiffs alleged that in auditing Fran’s false statements or omissions, 
the accountants furthered the fraud and knew that Cascade was incapable of infusing 
capital into both of these subsidiaries that needed substantial capital to survive.  Id. at 1201. 
7 A Form 10-K is an annual report required of publicly traded companies by the federal 
securities laws. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).  The annual report 
on Form 10-K “provides a comprehensive overview of the company’s business and 
financial condition and includes audited financial statements.”  Id.  Also, the Form 10-K is 
different from the annual report to shareholders that companies must send to shareholders 
when it holds an annual meeting to elect directors.  Id. 
8 Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1200. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1199.  In fact, Cascade’s attorneys were viewed as having acted as Cascade’s 
“hired gun” in fending off those who raised questions concerning Cascade.  In re Cascade, 
840 F. Supp. at 1572. 
11 Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1199.  The plaintiffs alleged that the attorneys had prepared the 
statement “without ‘appropriate investigation or inquiry.’”  Id.  In fact, the law firm had 
never assured itself of the accuracy of the proposed statements.  Id.  Later, on October 2, 
1991, the attorneys sent Incendy, at his request, an opinion letter regarding the bankruptcy 
status of Conston.  Id.  Despite its knowledge that the Conston’s Plan of Reorganization had 
been confirmed in April of 1991, the attorneys concluded that there was no doubt that 
Conston was in bankruptcy, giving Incendy reason to justify the non consolidation of 
Conston’s financial statements with Cascade’s in 1991.  Id. 
12 Id.  A month later, that same attorney wrote a letter to The Miami Review about an 
article that was being prepared about Cascade and claimed “there was no justification for 
printing such an incomplete and un-investigated article.”  Id. at 1200. 
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It was not until November 1991 that Cascade announced that its 
previous financial statements might not be accurate and it appeared that 
Cascade’s attorneys and accountants had misinformed the public with 
their assuring statements.13 Cascade then announced it was filing 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and revealed that it had materially 
misrepresented its assets, profits, and revenues.14  As a result, investors 
brought class actions not only against Cascade’s CEO, but also against its 
attorneys, and its accountants.15  The plaintiffs alleged that the attorneys 
and accountants were primary violators of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (“10b-
5”) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),16 because 
the law firm and the accountants had made “material misrepresentations 
or omissions” regarding Cascade’s “real” financial situation.17  
The facts from the Cascade scandal, though they are over a decade 
old, represent a familiar and common scenario pervasive in today’s 
business world.18  The players—auditors, bankers, and accountants 
                                                 
13 Id. at 1198.  The statements in question were for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1991.  
Id.  Subsequently, the National Association of Securities Dealers halted trading in Cascade 
stock until the company could provide the public with accurate financial statements.  Id.  
Stockholders held at least $27 million, based on stock shares that became almost worthless 
the day after Incendy disappeared.  David Altaner, Scandal Rears Its Ugly Head: Three Years 
Later, Cascade Fraud Scheme Is Back in the News, SUN-SENTINEL, June 4, 1995, at 1D.  One 
investor, after learning that the Incendy had gone missing commented, “It was easy to get 
sucked in by the story they were telling. . . .  You read a 10K . . . and you don’t think they’re 
going to lie.  But now I’ve learned that if it seems too good to be true, it probably is.”  Carla 
Lazzareschi, Case of Missing CEO: Cascade Investors Fear Stock Is Worthless, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at D1. 
14 Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1198. 
15 Id. at 1197.  Plaintiffs also brought suit against Cascade’s independent auditor, 
Bernard Levy.  Id. 
16 See infra Part II.A (discussing the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act in detail). 
17 Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1199.  Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that during talks 
between Cascade and one of its subsidiaries, Conston, in the summer and fall of 1991, 
while the two entities were considering a deal with designer Oleg Cassini, the attorneys 
advised Cascade how to issue information to the public regarding the proposed deal.  Id.  
However, in the fall after Cascade issued two press releases regarding a purported 
agreement that it and Conston had reached with Oleg Cassini, the law firm was actively 
involved in trying to help Cascade and Conston get out of the agreement.  Id.  However, 
the firm made no effort to cause Cascade to issue any press releases disclaiming the June 
1991 press releases.  Id. 
18 See, e.g., In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., No. MDL 02-1355-B, 02-266-B 2004 WL 2348315 (D.N.H. 
Oct. 14, 2004); In re Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In 
re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Enron Corp. Sec., 
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  See also Peter Elkind et al., 
Judgment Day, FORTUNE, Jan. 23, 2006, at 58 (discussing the Enron scandal’s effect on the 
image of corporate America, and in particular, the role of CEOs Ken Lay and Jeffrey 
Skilling in the fraud); Stephen Labaton, Four Years Later, Enron’s Shadow Lingers as Change 
Comes Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, § 6, at 1 (discussing the aftermath of the Enron 
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(known as secondary actors)—are often sued alongside directors and 
officers when public representations about the health of the company 
turn out to be false.19  Generally, the firm’s CEOs or CFOs are publicly 
associated with distributing the alleged misstatements or omissions and 
it is often easier to sue officers since they are publicly associated with the 
statements.20   
However, the scope of private suits against secondary actors under 
10b-5 has been in flux since the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank 
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.21  In Central Bank, the Supreme 
Court determined that there was no private right of action for aiders and 
abettors under § 10(b), and that if investors wanted to recover from 
secondary actors, investors would have to show that the secondary 
actors were primarily liable.22  However, over ten years after Central 
Bank, the standard of “primary” liability for secondary actors is still in 
disarray.23  
The resulting uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding § 10(b) 
liability for secondary actors has caused a clear and distinct split among 
the circuits that remains unsolved despite the wave of corporate 
misbehavior over recent years.24  First, the Ninth Circuit’s approach 
                                                                                                             
scandal); Robert Trigaux, Could the Scandals Be Over? Don’t Bet, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 
16, 2006, at 1D (noting that Enron was the first in a large wave of corporate scandals, and 
summarizing the ultimate results of the downfall of companies like Global Crossing, 
Worldcom, and Tyco). 
19 These actors are also often referred to as “gatekeepers.”  See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
301 (2004).  Coffee presents a discussion of the past and present role of gatekeepers.  Id. at 
308.  A “gatekeeper is a reputational intermediary” who provides verification or 
certification services to investors.  Id.  Examples of gatekeepers include an auditor 
providing certification of an issuer’s financial statements, an investment banker providing 
its “fairness opinion” as to the pricing of a merger, and a securities attorney for the issuer 
providing its opinion that all material information has been properly disclosed.  Id. at 309.  
Coffee notes that “the professional gatekeeper essentially assesses or vouches for the 
corporate client’s own statements about itself or a specific transaction.”  Id.  Markets often 
depend on gatekeepers because a “gatekeeper has a lesser incentive to deceive than does its 
client and thus regards the gatekeeper’s assurance or evaluation as more credible.”  Id. 
20 See infra Part III.B (discussing the Bright Line test, which was utilized in the Cascade 
case). 
21 511 U.S. 164 (1994).  See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Central Bank). 
22 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.  More specifically, the Supreme Court stated that anyone, 
“including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a 
material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may 
be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5.”  Id. 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See infra Part III. 
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imposes liability on a secondary actor when a plaintiff shows the actor’s 
“substantial participation” in the fraud.25  Conversely, the Second Circuit 
utilizes a “bright line” approach, imposing liability when an actor makes 
a misstatement or omission that is publicly attributable to him.26  
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit imposes liability only if an actor made a 
misstatement or omission that he knew or should have known would be 
made public.27  The fourth and final approach is advocated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and finds liability when 
an actor “creates” a misrepresentation.28 
Although each of the tests has positive attributes, none of the tests 
adequately and effectively creates a standard of liability that serves the 
goals of the federal securities laws and the current interpretations of 
§ 10(b) jurisprudence.29  As is discussed more fully in Part IV, each of the 
tests suffer from a similar defect:  the same attributes that make it 
desirable as a standard for primary liability are overshadowed by the 
potential harm the standard causes to the public, professionals, and the 
integrity of the securities market.30  A fusion of the beneficial qualities of 
the tests is needed to provide certainty and predictability to 
professionals.31 
Part II of this Note discusses the development of the private right of 
action for § 10(b) actions and the demise of the aiding and abetting action 
in Central Bank.32  Part III examines the various approaches to primary 
liability for secondary actors currently taken by the circuits.33  Then, Part 
IV critically examines the tests in light of their respective abilities to 
uphold the reliance requirement under § 10(b), comport with the 
                                                 
25 See infra Part III.A. 
26 See infra Part III.B. 
27 See infra Part III.C. 
28 See infra Part III.D. 
29 Where one approach succeeds in protecting the investor, the same approach provides 
a loop hole for crafty attorneys and auditors to avoid liability.  See infra Part III.B 
(discussing the Bright Line test).  Conversely, where one test adequately catches actors 
whose participation in fraud amounts to primary liability, the same test ignores the 
longstanding requirement that the investors have relied on the misrepresentation made by 
the actor.  See infra Part III.D (discussing the Creation test). 
30 See infra Part IV (examining the circuits’ approaches to secondary actor liability in 
light of the reliance requirement of § 10(b), the goals of the Exchange Act, and the policies 
articulated in Central Bank). 
31 See infra Part IV. 
32 See infra Part II (examining § 10(b), its reliance requirement as established in the 
FOMT, and the decision in Central Bank). 
33 See infra Part III (discussing the circuit split regarding secondary actor liability under 
§ 10(b)). 
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legislative purposes of the Exchange Act, and satisfy the goals 
articulated by the Court in Central Bank.34  Finding that none of the tests 
possess all the qualities desired in an adequate approach to primary 
liability, Part V introduces a Proposed Test, combining various qualities 
from current tests.35   
II.  BACKGROUND:  RELIANCE AND SECONDARY ACTOR LIABILITY UNDER THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
In order to adequately assess the various approaches to secondary 
liability under § 10(b), a complete understanding of the purpose and 
elements of § 10(b) is necessary.  Part II focuses on the requirement of 
§ 10(b) that a plaintiff must have relied on an actor’s material 
misstatement in order to proceed with a claim against a secondary 
actor.36  In particular, given that the reliance requirement is the most 
litigated and most challenging element of § 10(b), Part II examines the 
development of the reliance requirement in the courts, paying particular 
attention to the underlying theory of the reliance requirement, the Fraud 
on the Market Theory (“FOMT”).37  Further, Part II examines the 
Supreme Court’s elimination of the aiding and abetting private right of 
action in Central Bank.38   
A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:  A Private Right of Action Under the Federal 
Securities Laws 
As with many provisions of the Exchange Act, Congress chose to 
leave the specific parameters of defining liability out of § 10(b), and 
instead delegated the implementation and interpretation to the SEC.39  
                                                 
34 See infra Part IV. 
35 See infra Part V (discussing this Note’s Proposed Test for secondary actor liability). 
36 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the reliance requirement under § 10(b); infra Part II.A.2 
(discussing the FOMT); infra Part II.A.3 (discussing Basic v. Levinson). 
37 See infra Part II.A. 
38 See infra Part II.B (discussing Central Bank and the elimination of aiding and abetting 
under § 10(b)). 
39 Elizabeth A. Nowicki, 10(b) or Not 10(b)?: Yanking the Security Blanket for Attorneys in 
Securities Litigation, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 637, 677-78, 678 n.172 (2004) (noting that the 
vagueness and deference to agency administration was deliberate).  In fact, Congress 
delegated the task of dealing with securities problems to the SEC in an effort to establish a 
specialized agency with expertise in the matters of securities regulation.  See Joseph A. 
Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The 
Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1018 n.287 (1994) (noting “that Wall Street 
believed that it could exert greater influence over an agency devoted solely to the 
governance of its affairs . . . and that a new and specialized agency’s understanding of 
capital market processes would likely be more sympathetic to business interests”). 
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Rule 10b-5, which is similar to the wording in § 10(b)40 of the Exchange 
Act, provides:   
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly . . .  
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material41 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.42   
                                                 
40 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or 
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors. 
Id. 
41 Information is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the 
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”  TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  See also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (expressly 
adopting the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context). 
42 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).  Rule 10b-5 is an example of the SEC’s broad power to 
promulgate rules and courts are often required to determine what level of deference should 
be given to its interpretations of regulations.  See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  In Chevron, the Court held that if the intent of 
Congress is clear, then both the court and the agency must give effect to the unambiguous 
intent of Congress.  Id.  However, if the statute is ambiguous or silent on an issue, then the 
court must defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of that statute, even if that 
interpretation is not the one which the court would have chosen.  Id. at 843.  See also Torrey 
A. Cope, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Jurisdiction After Mead, 78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1327, 1333 (2005).  Cope looks at the modern development of deference to 
administrative agencies, noting that it has always “been based on the institutional 
competencies that agencies have when it comes to interpreting regulatory statutes: 
technical expertise, political accountability, and an ability to adapt their interpretations 
over time.”  Id. at 1331.  Additionally, Cope recognizes that agencies are indirectly 
accountable to the electorate through the President, and therefore are more democratic 
than the courts.  Id. at 1334.  A third reason for judicial deference is that courts are more 
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However, despite Congress’ strong interest in protecting the 
investor, neither § 10(b) nor 10b-5 explicitly provide a cause of action for 
plaintiffs injured by securities fraud; 43 however, an implied private right 
of action imposed by the courts, is well established.44  To state a claim for 
                                                                                                             
inflexible than agencies, because they are forced to consider statutory ambiguity on a case-
by case basis.  Id. at 1334-35.  In contrast, agencies contend with everyday implementation 
of the statutes they administer and have a much clearer understanding of the statute’s 
intricacies.  Id. at 1335.  See also Cass R. Sustein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and 
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 926-27 (2003) (recognizing additional advantages of 
agency deference and delegation, including that agencies may be able to better promote 
national uniformity, whereas courts are limited by their circuits); Cass R. Sustein, Law & 
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2072 (1990) (emphasizing that the 
New Deal reformers believed that modern problems “required institutions having 
flexibility, expertise, managerial capacity, political accountability, and powers of initiative 
far beyond those of the courts,” and that agencies were well equipped to acquire such 
expertise).  However, deference to administrative agencies is generally not afforded to 
agency interpretation of private causes of actions under statutes administered by the 
agency.  See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (finding that even 
if the Agricultural Worker Protection Act’s language establishing a private right of action 
was ambiguous, the court would not defer to the Secretary of Labor’s view of the scope of 
the Act because Congress had established the judiciary as the adjudicator of private rights 
of action).  See also Francis J. Facciola, When Deference Becomes Abdication: Immunizing 
Widespread Broker-Dealer Practices from Judicial Review Through the Possibility of SEC 
Oversight, 73 MISS. L.J. 1, 88 (2003).  Although the SEC has a directive to improve market 
efficiency and to protect investors, these two goals often conflict, forcing the SEC to favor 
one responsibility over the other.  Id.  Facciolo notes that the SEC’s resources have failed to 
increase at a comparable rate to the growth of the securities markets.  Id. at 89.  The 
problem is further complicated by the involvement of the individual investor in the market, 
spreading SEC resources even thinner.  Id.  Consequently, Facciolo argues that the SEC’s 
lack of resources has limited its ability to “effectively audit and study broker-dealer 
practices.”  Id.  at 91. 
43 S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934) (emphasizing that Congress passed the Exchange Act 
in hopes that federal regulation would ensure an honest securities market and promote 
investor confidence).  See also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 
680 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (stating that one of the basic philosophies of the Exchange Act is 
disclosure and the creation and maintenance of a post-issuance securities market that is 
free from fraudulent practices); Scott Siamas, Primary Securities Fraud Liability for Secondary 
Actors: Revisiting Central Bank of Denver in the Wake of Enron, Worldcom, and Arthur 
Andersen, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895 (2004) (noting that Congress believed that the public 
disclosure of material company information would ensure accountability and fairness in 
the markets, allowing investors to make knowledgeable decisions).  See generally Peter J. 
Dennin, Which Came First, the Fraud or the Market: Is the Fraud-Created-The-Market Theory 
Valid Under Rule 10b-5?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611 (2001) (providing a thorough 
explanation of the background of the Exchange Act and its reliance requirements, as well as 
the presumptions based on the fraud created the market theory); Steve Thel, The Original 
Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990) 
(discussing the history behind the passage of the Exchange Act and a discussion regarding 
the form the Exchange Act should take). 
44 See, e.g., Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (finding that “a 
private right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 has been consistently 
recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond 
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relief under 10b-5 for securities fraud, a plaintiff must allege five 
elements:  (1) scienter; (2) materiality; (3) loss causation; (4) reliance or 
causation; and (5) that the fraud occurred in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities.45  This Note addresses the reliance 
requirement because it is the most challenging and most difficult 
element to prove and key to any standard for secondary actor liability. 46 
1. The Development of the Reliance Requirement Under Rule 10b-5 
Under Rule 10b-5, reliance requires that the plaintiff knew or should 
have known of the alleged misrepresentations, believed them to be true, 
and because of that belief, purchased or sold the security in question.47  
However, when there is an allegation of an omission, requiring a 
plaintiff to show a hypothetical state of facts explaining how he would 
have behaved if the omitted material information had been disclosed, 
places an unwieldy and unfair burden on the plaintiff.48  Accordingly, in 
                                                                                                             
peradventure”).  The right was first recognized in Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 
798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).  See also Dennin, supra note 43, at 2648 (noting the Exchange Act 
was “a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices”) (internal citations omitted); Tarik 
J. Haskins, Holding Secondary Actors Liable: Defining Primary Liability Under Section 10(b), 71 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2003) (noting that the SEC lacks the resources to police the 
markets). 
45 See, e.g., R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that in 
order to state a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities: (1) a misstatement or an omission; (2) of material 
fact; (3) made with scienter; (4) on which plaintiff relied; and (5) that proximately caused 
the plaintiff’s injury); see also In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. Sec. Litig., 103 Fed. Appx. 465, 
468 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1095 (10th Cir. 
2003) (same). 
46 See Robert S. De Leon, The Fault Lines Between Primary Liability and Aiding and Abetting 
Claims Under Rule 10b-5, 22 J. CORP. L. 723, 734 (1997) (emphasizing that reliance can be 
proven in several ways, including actual reliance on the misstatement or omission, 
presumed reliance based on the fraud on the market theory, and presumed reliance due to 
an omission of material information by a defendant who had a duty to disclose such 
information to the plaintiff). 
47 Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 413 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Abell v. 
Potomac, 858 F.2d 1104, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
The element of reliance is the subjective counterpart to the objective 
element of materiality. Whereas materiality requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate how a “reasonable” investor would have viewed the 
defendants’ statements and omissions, reliance requires a plaintiff to 
prove that it actually based its decisions upon the defendants’ 
misstatements or omissions. “Reliance is causa sine qua non, a type of 
‘but for’ requirement: had the investor known the truth he would not 
have acted.” 
Id. 
48 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).  The 
defendants in Ute were two officers of the bank which was the transfer agent for a tribal 
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Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,49 the Supreme Court created 
a presumption of reliance where the defendant failed to disclose material 
information.50  Subsequently, the most predominant theory of reliance 
for § 10(b) actions, the FOMT, was later adopted in response to the 
special problems of proving reliance in class actions. 51   
2. The Fraud on the Market Theory 
The FOMT is based on two propositions:  (1) in open, secondary 
markets,52 the price of stock is determined by all available information; 
                                                                                                             
corporation that managed and distributed assets to members of the Ute Native American 
Tribe.  Id. at 136.  The bank officers induced tribal members to sell their stock at below-
market rates, while the officers purchased a significant number of shares themselves and 
arranged sales to non-Native American investors, for which they received commissions.  Id. 
at 147.  As a result, the Court found that the Utes had the right to know that the bank 
officers were in a position to gain financially from the sales of the stock and that the stock 
was selling at a higher price in the market that the officers had developed.  Id. at 154. 
49 Id.  The Court found that the duty to disclose and the withholding of material facts 
established the requisite element of causation.  Id. 
50 However, the Affiliated Ute presumption is limited to omissions and cannot be used to 
recover due to affirmative misrepresentations.  See, e.g., Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1162 
(10th Cir. 2000) (finding that in a case where the complaint alleges a mix of material 
omissions and affirmative misrepresentations, “[a] strict application of the omissions-
misrepresentations dichotomy would require the trial judge to instruct the jury to presume 
reliance with regard to the omitted facts, [but] not to presume reliance with regard to the 
misrepresented facts”) (citing Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188 ) (3d Cir. 
1981)).  Another basis for reliance, the “Fraud Created the Market” presumption, permits a 
plaintiff to maintain an action under § 10(b) by proving the defendant’s fraud allowed 
securities that otherwise would have been unmarketable to come into and exit the market.  
See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981).  In Sklar, the defendants had engaged 
in a complicated scheme to create a bond issue so lacking in basic requirements it would 
have never been approved absent the massive fraud that was involved.  Id. at 464 n.2.  The 
court in Sklar indicated that the plaintiff would be entitled to a presumption of reliance if 
he could show “that the defendants knowingly conspired to bring securities onto the 
market which were not entitled to be marketed, intending to defraud purchasers.”  Id. at 
469.  Further, the Fifth Circuit made it clear that the plaintiff could not recover if he “proves 
no more than that the bonds would have been offered at a lower price or a higher rate, 
rather than that they would never have been issued or marketed.”  Id. at 470. 
51 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Supreme Court’s adoption of the FOMT in Basic).  
See also Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance 
Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV 435, 439 (1984).  Black notes 
that Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expanded the availability of class actions 
and “prompted many courts to view the class action as an appropriate vehicle for 
adjudicating the liability of defendants whose misstatements affected many open market 
investors.”  Id. at 439-40.  However, while some courts have held that the requirement of 
individual reliance made the class action inappropriate for Rule 10b-5 claims, others sought 
to relax or eliminate the reliance requirement in these cases.  Id. at 440. 
52 A secondary market is the market for goods or services that have previously been 
available for buying and selling, especially the securities market in which previously issued 
securities are traded among investors.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (8th ed. 2004). 
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and (2) investors rely on the integrity of market prices when making 
investment decisions.53  Based on these presumptions, a plaintiff 
becomes injured when the market appraises the price of the plaintiff’s 
stock based on information misrepresented by the defendant.54  As a 
result, reliance under the FOMT means reliance on the integrity of the 
market price rather than on the challenged disclosure.55   
Beneath the FOMT is the principle of the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis (“ECMH”), which proposes that an efficient market56 
instantaneously assimilates available information and determines a price 
                                                 
53 See R. Douglas Martin, Basic Inc. v. Levinson: The Supreme Court’s Analysis of Fraud on 
the Market and its Impact on the Reliance Requirement of SEC Rule 10B-5, 78 KY. L.J. 403, 418 
(1990).  Developing slowly over more than two decades, the FOMT appeared first in 
academic scholarship and then in the lower courts.  Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking 
“Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1006 (2003).  The FOMT was recognized as 
early as 1967, in a treatise that recognized that “in open-market transactions involving 
thousands of investors who purchase a company’s securities based on their belief in the 
marketplace, proving reliance upon the company’s alleged misrepresentations is not only 
impractical, but theoretically misguided as well.”  Id. at 1006. 
54 Martin, supra note 53, at 419.  Therefore, damages arise when a buyer or seller pays a 
different price for the shares than if there had been no fraud.  Id.  Martin discusses the 
significance of the decision in Basic v. Levinson, addressing whether a presumption of 
reliance supported by the fraud on the market theory should be applied in situations 
involving material public misrepresentations.  Id. at 404. 
55 Daniel R. Fischel, Symposium on the Regulation of Secondary Trading Markets, Program 
Trading, Volatility, Portfolio Insurance, and the Role of Specialists and Market Makers: Efficient 
Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 908 
(1989).  As a result, a plaintiff’s lack of familiarity with the particular misrepresentation 
becomes irrelevant and the reliance barrier to class certification is eliminated.  Id.  Instead 
the relevant issue is whether the market price was inflated or deflated rather than to what 
extent a particular investor was aware of a certain disclosure.  Id.  Additionally, because 
requiring that investors actually be familiar with the misstatement would create a 
tremendous burden on investors to satisfy the reliance requirement and make class 
certification a virtual impossibility, courts utilized the FOMT to accommodate Rule 10b-5 
class actions.  Black, supra note 51, at 472. 
56 An “efficient market” is: 
a market where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers  
actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of 
individual securities, and where important current information is 
almost freely available to all participants.  In an efficient market, 
competition among the many intelligent participants leads to a 
situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual 
securities already reflect the effects of information based both on 
events that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, the 
market expects to take place in the future.  In other words, in an 
efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a security will 
be a good estimate of its intrinsic value. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and the Random Walk Theory, http://www.investor 
home.com/emh.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006). 
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for that security which reflects all of the available information.57  More 
specifically, the most widely accepted form of the ECMH, known as the 
semi-strong form, suggests that the price of securities reflects all publicly 
available information.58  Consequently, courts can assume that any 
material misrepresentations by an issuer of securities will quickly and 
accurately be reflected in the market price of the issuer’s securities.59  In 
Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court used the FOMT and the ECMH to 
develop a rebuttable presumption of reliance for § 10(b) actions. 60   
3. The Development of the Rebuttable Presumption Under § 10(b) in 
Basic v. Levinson 
In Basic, former stockholders brought a class action against Basic Inc., 
a manufacturer of chemical refractories for the steel industry, alleging 
that Basic’s directors had made material misstatements regarding merger 
discussions during 1977 and 1978.61  In finding for the plaintiffs, the 
                                                 
57 Oldham, supra note 53, at 1010-11.  In fact, the ECMH has been divided into three 
theories of market efficiency, each based on the type of information assimilated into the 
market price: the weak, semi-strong, and strong.  Fischel, supra note 55, at 911.  The strong 
form of the ECMH asserts that all public and private information are fully reflected in the 
price of a stock; consequently, insider traders cannot outperform the market.  Id.  On the 
opposite end of the spectrum, the weak form of the hypothesis suggests that historical 
information is inherent in the current price of that stock; therefore, investors cannot have 
an edge by knowing the history of successive prices.  Id. 
58 See Fischel, supra note 55, at 911.  As a result, any efforts to acquire and analyze 
publicly available knowledge would not produce any different results from those who do 
no analysis.  Id. at 909-11.  Based on the semi-strong form of the ECMH, courts have 
developed the basic premise of the FOMT-that prices of securities reflect publicly available 
information.  Id. at 911.  Courts adopting the FOMT have alluded to empirical studies 
supporting the validity of the semi-strong version of the ECMH.  Id.  Specifically, market 
prices of actively traded securities are likely to reflect information about securities because 
of the “continuous buying and selling decisions of investors.”  Id.  For example, “if a 
consensus among market professionals exists that a particular type of land owned by a 
publicly-traded real estate company is worth a certain amount, this consensus will be 
reflected in the company’s stock price.”  Id.  As a result, because the prices reflect publicly 
available information, it is reasonable for many investors to accept the market price.  Id.  
Consequently, investors who purchase securities that reflect false information from 
disclosure defects are also harmed.  Id.  However, the weak and strong forms are supported 
by empirical evidence as well.  Id. 
59 Oldham, supra note 53, at 1011 n.106.  There is a presumption that an investor may 
reasonably “rely on the integrity of the market price of any such security.”  Id.  Then, 
“because an investor who trades in a particular security can be presumed to have done so 
based on the market price of that security, if that market price reflects some 
misrepresentation made by the issuer of the security, the trader can be deemed to have 
relied on the misrepresentation itself.”  Id. 
60 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S 224, 245 (1988). 
61 Id. at 226-27.  During 1977 and 1978, Basic made three public statements denying that 
it was engaged in merger negotiations, although it had in fact been approached by another 
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Court adopted the idea that the FOMT created a rebuttable presumption 
that plaintiffs relied on any public misstatements or omissions made in 
violation of § 10(b).62  In its analysis, the Court reasoned that purchasers 
generally rely on the price of the stock as a reflection of its values.63  
Additionally, the Court noted that Congress expressly relied on the 
premise that information affects the securities markets and enacted 
legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of those 
markets.64  Most significantly, in adopting the FOMT, the Court made 
                                                                                                             
company regarding a merger.  Id.  However, in December 1978, Basic issued a release 
admitting it had been approached by another company concerning a merger and asked the 
New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading of its shares.  Id. at 227-28.  Consequently, 
the plaintiffs brought a class action against Basic and its directors, asserting that the 
defendants’ three initial misstatements regarding the mergers were made in violation of 
Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) and that as a result, the plaintiffs were injured by selling Basic 
shares at artificially depressed prices.  Id. at 228. 
62 Id. at 230-31, 245-49.  To use a rebuttable presumption based on the FOMT, a plaintiff 
must prove: (1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that the 
misrepresentations were material; (3) that the shares were traded on an efficient market; (4) 
that the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the 
value of the shares; and (5) that the plaintiff traded the shares between the time the 
misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.  Id.  To rebut a FOMT 
presumption, a defendant must sever the link between the misrepresentation and the price 
the plaintiff paid or earned.  Id. at 248-49.  Either the defendant could show that the 
plaintiff knew the misrepresentation was false and did not rely on the statement or that the 
truth had already entered the market and altered the price of the stock based on the truth.  
Id. 
63 Id. at 245.  “There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.  Manipulation 
and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy.”  H.R. REP. 
NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934).  The Court in Basic also emphasized that Congress “relied on the 
premise that securities markets are affected by information, and enacted legislation to 
facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of those markets.”  Basic, 485 U.S. at 246. 
64 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246. 
The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that 
competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a 
security brings [sic] about a situation where the market price reflects as 
nearly as possible a just price.  Just as artificial manipulation tends to 
upset the true function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting 
of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as 
indices of real value. 
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934)).  As a result, the Court in Basic found that the 
presumption based on the FOMT facilitated the goals of the Exchange Act.  Id. at 246.  
However Justice White and Justice O’Connor strongly disagreed with the use of the FOMT 
in Basic.  Id. at 251-53.  The Dissent offers illustrations of the dangers that arise when 
economic theories replace legal rules as the basis for recovery.  Id. at 253.  (White, J., 
dissenting).  Additionally, Justice White discusses the failure of the FOMT, recognized by 
courts and academia alike.  Id. at 253-54.  See also Martin, supra note 53, at 426 (arguing that 
the FOMT runs contrary to the legislative history and purpose of the Exchange Act and the 
Securities Act because Congress rejected an anti-fraud provision similar to the FOMT that 
would have allowed plaintiff’s to recover solely for showing the price of the security that 
had traded was affected by a misrepresentation).  Cf. Dennin, supra note 43, at 2643.  
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clear that it was interested in the public nature of fraudulent 
misrepresentations, and not in individual reliance or knowledge of a 
particular misrepresentation.65  As a result, in Basic, the Court clarified 
and solidified the reliance requirement under § 10(b) and the FOMT has 
become the most widely used method of proving reliance.66   
B. Secondary Liability Under § 10b and Rule 10b-5:  Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver 
Although the Supreme Court in Basic expanded the private right of 
action under Rule 10b-5 by enabling more class actions, six years later, 
the Court restricted that same right.67  In Central Bank, the Supreme 
Court eliminated the longstanding custom of investors bringing actions 
against secondary actors for aiding and abetting securities fraud.68  This 
Part addresses the historical developments and changes regarding the 
ability of investors to recover against secondary actors who participated 
in the commission of securities fraud.69  
                                                                                                             
Dennin notes that when the FOMT is properly applied, the FOMT “directly flows from the 
purpose of the Exchange Act, which is to create and maintain an honest and fair securities 
market.”  Id.  Dennin argues that in particular, the FOMT is necessary because “disclosure 
is an insufficient regulatory structure” because investors cannot analyze all of the 
information in the marketplace and cannot evaluate investment opportunities.  Id. 
65 Basic, 485 U.S. at 247-49. 
66 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the FOMT); supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s adoption of the FOMT in Basic). 
67 See infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
68 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994).  
The elements of the cause of action for aiding and abetting of a Rule 10b-5 violation were: 
(1) an independent disclosure violation; (2) actual knowledge, or recklessness, by the aider 
and abettor of the misrepresentation and his role in furthering it; and (3) the aider and 
abettor provided substantial assistance in the transaction giving rise to the investor’s 
injury.  Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992). 
69 See infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (discussing the elimination of the aiding 
and abetting private right of action in Central Bank). 
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Violations of 10b-5 are rarely perpetrated by a single actor.70  As a 
result, for three decades, accountants, lawyers, underwriters, and banks 
were routinely held liable under § 10(b) for aiding and abetting their 
clients’ violations. 71  However, due to increased uncertainty about the 
scope of private liability under 10b-5,72  the Court in Central Bank was 
confronted with whether private liability under 10b-5 was actually 
meant to extend to aiders and abettors.73  Focusing on the text of § 10(b), 
                                                 
70 In fact, professionals play a very important dual role in the markets.  Lisa H. 
Nicholson, A Hobson’s Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron Environment: Striking a 
Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
91, 100 (2002).  Nicholson discusses the professional conflict resulting from lawyers’ duties 
to their clients and to the markets, observing that lawyers play a significant role in 
providing legal advice on securities transactions and actively participating in the 
structuring and documentation of those transactions.  Id.  More specifically, Nicholson 
notes that securities lawyers routinely draft and revise “transactional” and “disclosure” 
documents, make comments, make edits, file documents with the SEC, respond to 
comments by the SEC, and approve press releases and public disclosures.  Id.  Documents 
reviewed and prepared by lawyers include prospectuses, proxy statements, annual reports, 
and press releases, all of which may be relied on by investors in making investment 
decisions.  Id.  Conversely, securities lawyers also must involuntarily be “gatekeepers,” 
charged with the task of “level[ing] the playing fields” of the markets.  Id.  In fact, the SEC 
and the investing public “increasingly expect securities lawyers to ensure their clients’ 
compliance with the federal securities laws.”  Id.  (emphasis added).  As evidence, 
Nicholson notes several SEC commissioners that have emphasized the SEC’s reliance on 
market professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, in assisting the SEC in its 
maintenance of market integrity and investors.  Id. at 100-01.  See also Hillary A. Sale, Banks: 
The Forgotten(?) Partners in Fraud, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 139, 139-40 (2004).  Sale notes that the 
design of the U.S. securities system is based on the existence of intermediaries, 
professionals who provide transparency in disclosures.  Id.  As gatekeepers, these 
professionals include accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers.  Id.  These 
professionals are “key to the assumption that disclosures are clean and accurate and, 
thereby, are essential to the functioning of an efficient market.”  Id. 
71 Prior to 1994, every circuit recognized aiding and abetting as a violation of Rule 10b-5.  
See, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Invs., 959 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1992); Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co., 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991); Robin v. 
Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1990); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 
F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987); Rudolph v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040 (11th Cir. 1986); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 
774 (1st Cir. 1983); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978). 
72 Prior to the decision in Central Bank, many courts had begun to question the validity of 
the aiding and abetting action.  Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 169-70.  See, e.g., Benoay v. Decker, 
517 F. Supp. 490, 495, aff’d, 735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting it was “doubtful that a 
claim for ‘aiding and abetting’ . . . will continue to exist under 10(b)”). 
73 Central Bank., 511 U.S. at 167.  Central Bank served as a trustee for a bond issue that 
backed a failed residential and commercial development.  Id.  In 1986 and 1988, the 
Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority (“Authority”) issued a total of 
$26 million in bonds to finance public improvements at Stetson Hills, a planned residential 
and commercial development in Colorado Springs.  Id.  The bond covenants required that 
the land subject to the liens be at least 160% of the bonds’ outstanding principal and 
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the Court found that the problem with aiding and abetting liability was 
that it extended liability beyond persons who “engage,” even if only 
“indirectly,” in illegal activities connected with securities transactions.74  
Further, the Court declared that Congress had chosen to impose aiding 
and abetting liability in other aspects of the law, and specifically used 
“aid” and “abet” in those statutory texts.75  As a result, since none of the 
express causes of action in the Exchange Act imposes aiding and abetting 
liability, the Court inferred that Congress did not intend for there to be 
aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b).76   
Most importantly, the Court articulated several concerns that have 
fueled post-Central Bank analysis.77  Specifically, the Court found that the 
                                                                                                             
interests.  Id.  The covenants also required the developer to give Central Bank an annual 
report showing that the 160% test was met.  Id.  When property values fell, Central Bank 
ignored the advice of a senior bond underwriter and its in-house appraiser to hire an 
outside appraiser to review the value of the bonds. Id.  Additionally, the senior underwriter 
was concerned about declining property values in Colorado Springs and the fact that 
Central Bank was operating on an appraisal that was more than sixteen months old.  Id.  
The letter suggested that the Authority may have given false certifications of compliance 
with the bond covenants.  Id.  In fact, Central Bank delayed the independent review until 
the end of the year, but by then the development had defaulted and the bonds were 
useless.  Id. at 168.  After the default, the plaintiffs sued Central Bank for violations under 
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act, alleging that Central Bank was secondarily liable for its 
conduct in aiding and abetting the fraud of the underwriters and the developer.  Id. 
74 Id. at 176.  The Court divided its precedent into two types of cases.  First were cases 
that determined the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b) and followed by cases that 
interpreted the elements of Rule 10b-5 private liability scheme.  See Andrew S. Gold, 
Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(B) and the Elements of Rule 10B-5: 
Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 667, 673 (2004).  
Aiding and abetting falls into the scope of the conduct line of precedent, in which 
Congressional silence indicates that Congress did not intend to impose such liability for 
aiding and abetting.  Id. at 674.  Additionally, the Court found that the other sections of the 
Exchange Act specified the conduct for which defendants could be found liable and 
occasionally even provided that “any person” could be liable.  Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176. 
75 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (general criminal aiding and 
abetting).  However, Congress had not chosen to add such language into the Exchange Act.  
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176. 
76 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 179.  See Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of 
Central Bank’s Textualist Approach—Attempts To Overdraw the Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1997).  Walker and Levine note that the Court generally does not 
favor implied private rights of action and was likely to apply a textualist approach to limit 
those rights.  Id.  Also, the Court was driven by its “belief that ‘litigation under Rule 10b-5 
presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which 
accompanies litigation in general.’”  Id. (citing Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 189 (quoting Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975))). 
77 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188.  In fact, the Court rejected various policy arguments 
offered by the SEC in favor of the aiding and abetting private right of action.  Id.  As amicus 
curiae, the SEC advanced several arguments in favor of a private cause of action for aiding 
and abetting.  Id. at 176.  Specifically, the SEC argued that the language “directly or 
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rules for aiding and abetting did not meet the demands for “certainty” 
and “predictability” of securities laws.78  Moreover, the Court 
emphasized that extra costs incurred by professionals due to litigation 
costs may be passed on to clients, and in turn investors, the intended 
beneficiaries of § 10(b).79   
Further, and most significantly for this Note, the Court emphasized 
that although there was no aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b), 
secondary actors were not free from liability under the federal securities 
laws.80  Instead, the Court determined that anyone, “including a lawyer, 
accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a 
material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of 
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5.”81  The 
effect of Central Bank was to shift the discussion of the extent of 
secondary liability to the unknown boundaries of primary liability for 
secondary actors.82  Additionally, Central Bank has deeply divided the 
                                                                                                             
indirectly” encompassed aiding and abetting.  Id.  Additionally, while conceding that the 
Exchange Act did not explicitly mention aiding and abetting, the SEC argued that Congress 
had intended to include the cause under § 10(b).  Id. at 177.  Finally, the SEC contended that 
the aiding and abetting cause of action deterred secondary actors and ensured that 
defrauded plaintiffs were made whole.  Id. at 188.  However, the Court held that policy 
considerations did not override textual interpretation.  Id.  See also Aegis J. Frumento, 
Misrepresentations of Secondary Actors in the Sale of Securities: Does In re Enron Square with 
Central Bank? 59 BUS. LAW. 975, 980 (2004) (stating that the Central Bank Court’s policy 
concerns were that the liability for aiding and abetting resulted in unpredictable legal rules 
and gave rise to the risk of litigation exposure unrelated to the merits of cases and causing 
inefficiency in capital markets and the economy). 
78 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 552, 652 (1988)).  The result 
was decisions made on an “ad hoc basis, offering little predictive value” to those in the 
securities business.  Id. 
79 Id. at 191.  The Court also emphasized that such uncertainty could lead entities subject 
to aiding and abetting liability, in their business judgment, to abandon substantial defenses 
and pay settlements in order to avoid expensive trials.  Id. at 189. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 191.  “Modern securities fraud is seldom committed by a single person in 
isolation. The nature of the scam requires that investors be lulled into a sense of trust.”  
Frumento, supra note 77, at 976.  See also Nicholson, supra note 70, at 100 (discussing 
lawyers’ roles in the securities markets). 
82 See, e.g., In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 
1995) (“Central Bank has generated a fair amount of confusion in the lower courts . . . in 
identifying the line between primary and secondary liability.”).  See also Russell P. Marsella, 
Who’s Primarily to Blame? The Quest for the Better Test of Section 10(b) Liability, 6 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 421, 433 (2000) (discussing the confusion after Central Bank regarding 
what primary liability was for secondary actors).  However, some critics continue to debate 
whether a cause of action for aiding and abetting should be reinstated.  See, e.g., Roger C. 
Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 
143, 182-83 (2002).  Cramton argues that the private right of action for aiding and abetting 
should be restored for professionals who assist a client in a securities fraud.  Id.  Noting 
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circuits on the level of involvement required to find secondary actors 
liable under § 10(b).83   
III.  THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR PRIMARY 
LIABILITY OF SECONDARY ACTORS  UNDER § 10(B) OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
With the aiding and abetting causes of actions eliminated in Central 
Bank, the only remaining option for private plaintiffs seeking a remedy 
for violations of 10b-5 is to allege a primary violation.84  However, since 
Central Bank, courts have developed four conflicting standards regarding 
the standard of primary liability for secondary actors.85   
First, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a very broad standard, imposing 
liability on secondary actors based on their “substantial participation” in 
the fraud.86  Conversely, the Second Circuit has adopted a “bright line” 
test, imposing liability on secondary actors only when the secondary 
                                                                                                             
that ethics rules place limits on what a lawyer may do in terms of a prohibition on 
“assisting” fraudulent or illegal conduct, and because state laws routinely provide for 
criminal liability for someone who assists in wrongdoing, he argues the private right of 
action should be restored.  Id. at 182.  Also, he argues that the absence of civil liability for 
aiding and abetting puts pressure on courts to stretch the meaning of a primary violation.  
Id. at 182-83. 
83 Additionally, the decision in Central Bank prompted federal securities reform.  
Following Central Bank, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”).  The text of the PSLRA is spread out and split up all over Title 15 of the United 
States Code.  For a complete view of the PSLRA, see Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).  
In passing the PSLRA, Congress had three primary objectives: (1) to encourage voluntary 
disclosure of information; (2) to encourage and empower investors so that they may control 
litigation; and (3) to discourage frivolous lawsuits.  S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 5-6 (1995).  The 
passage of the PSLRA was evidence of Congress’ approval of the elimination of the aiding 
and abetting cause of action for private plaintiffs by the Supreme Court in Central Bank.  See 
Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for 
Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1999).  Fisch offers a detailed 
discussion of the events and factors leading up to Congress’ passing of the PSLRA.  Id.  
However, the PSLRA’s extension of SEC enforcement actions to cover aiding and abetting 
liability effectively overturned Central Bank’s decision of the enforcement context.  Id. 
84 See Mary M. Wynne, Primary Liability Amongst Secondary Actors: Why the Second 
Circuit’s “Bright Line” Standard Should Prevail, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1607, 1612 (2000) (offering 
criticism of the Substantial Participation test and advocated that the Supreme Court resolve 
the circuit split by adopting the Bright Line approach from Wright). 
85 Specifically, it is unclear what the Court meant when it stated that one who “makes” a 
material misstatement could be held primarily liable.  Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 190. 
86 See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks Inc. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 (9th Cir. 1994); In re 
ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994); infra Part III.A (discussing the 
Substantial Participation test). 
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actors make a misstatement or omission attributable to them.87  Similarly, 
the Tenth Circuit in Anixter v. Home Stake Production Co. adopted a test 
that imposes liability if an actor knew or should have known that a 
misrepresentation he made would go public. 88  Finally, a district court in 
the Fifth Circuit has adopted a fourth approach, proposed by the SEC, 
which finds liability when an actor “creates” a misrepresentation.89  Part 
III addresses each of these approaches.90   
A. The Substantial Participation Test 
The broadest and most far reaching of the standards for secondary 
actors is the Substantial Participation test, proposed by the Ninth 
Circuit.91  In one of the earliest cases to address secondary actor liability 
after Central Bank, the court in In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation 
imposed liability on an actor who was “intricately involved” in the fraud 
of the primary actor.92  In ZZZZ Best, investors alleged that an 
accounting firm prepared a report and reviewed, created, and issued 
several statements related to a fraudulent scheme by ZZZZ Best.93  Even 
though the public had no indication that Ernst & Young had anything to 
do with the public statements, the court held that while the investing 
public may not be able to “reasonably attribute” any misstatements or 
                                                 
87 See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 152. F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998); In re MTC 
Elec. Tech. Shareholder Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); infra Part III.B 
(discussing the Bright Line test). 
88 See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996); infra Part III.C 
(discussing the elements of the Anixter test). 
89 See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002); infra Part III.D (discussing the Creation test). 
90 See infra Part III. 
91 See infra notes 99–105. 
92 In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
93 Id. at 970.  ZZZZ Best was a large, nationally known carpet cleaning company, and 
was widely regarded as extremely successful prior to its sudden collapse into bankruptcy 
in 1987.  Id. at 963.  However, the plaintiffs had alleged that the fraud was committed 
through a series of misleading statements and omissions of material fact made in public 
statements regarding ZZZZ Best, its finances, management, and future business prospects.  
Id.  The plaintiffs’ claims against the accounting firm arose as a result of the firm’s release 
of a review report on first quarter interim financial information for the three-month period 
ending July 31, 1986.  Id.  The report was included in ZZZZ Best’s December 1986 
prospectus and stated that: “we are not aware of any material modifications that should be 
made to the consolidated interim financial statements referred to above for them to be in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.”  Id. at 964.  However, the 
plaintiffs argued that the firm did know of problems with ZZZZ Best’s internal accounting 
procedures and knew the report was inaccurate.  Id. 
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omissions to the accounting firm, the securities market still relied on 
those statements.94   
Shortly after ZZZZ Best, in In re Software Toolworks Inc. Litigation, the 
Ninth Circuit imposed liability on an accounting firm for the “significant 
role” it played in the preparation of a client’s misleading statement to the 
SEC.95  In Software Toolworks, the court found that accountants providing 
merely “extensive review and discussions” could be held primarily liable 
under § 10(b).96  Additionally, in Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, 
Peeler, & Garrett, the court found that attorneys and accountants who 
participated in drafting their client’s prospectus were liable, thereby 
expanding the Substantial Participation test to include liability for 
merely drafting and editing an offering document.97  The Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
94 Id. at 971.  See also Amanda J. Aymond, Note, You’d Better Watch What They Say: An 
Examination of Primary Liability for Secondary Actors Under Section 10(b), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 
835, 857 (2000).  Aymond finds that the Substantial Participation test is consistent with 
Central Bank in that it requires defendants to be primarily culpable in requiring a 
substantial amount of participation.  Id.  However, Aymond argues that because 
“substantial participation” is ambiguous, once the court has concluded that the defendant 
has engaged in a deceitful act, it may hold a secondary actor primarily liable for what is 
actually aiding and abetting.  Id. 
95 In re Software Toolworks Inc. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 (9th Cir. 1994).  In July 1990, 
Software Toolworks, Inc., a producer of software for personal computers and Nintendo 
game systems, conducted a secondary public offering of common stock at $18.50 a share, 
raising more than $71 million.  Id. at 620.  However after the offering, the market price of 
Toolworks shares declined steadily until, on October 11, 1990, the stock was trading at 
$5.40 a share.  Id.  At that time, Toolworks issued a press release announcing substantial 
losses and the share price dropped another fifty-six percent to $2.375.  Id.  The following 
day, investors filed a class action alleging that Toolworks, auditor Deloitte & Touche, and 
underwriters Montgomery Securities and PaineWebber, Inc., had all knowingly defrauded 
and assisted in defrauding investors in violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Id.  Specifically, 
the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had falsified audited financial statements, 
fabricated sales to meet financial projections, and lied to the SEC.  Id. 
96 Id. at 628 n.3.  However, the accountants themselves had made no affirmative 
misstatements.  Id.  See also Aymond, supra note 94, at 857.  In In re Software Toolworks, the 
court also concluded that an accountant’s “significant role” in the drafting and editing was 
sufficient for a primary violation, but failed to explain what a “significant role” was.  Id.  As 
a result, Aymond argues that the significant participation standard is too broad and 
ambiguous in its application, because a deceitful act may be punished as a primary 
violation when it is merely aiding and abetting, and therefore not actionable under Central 
Bank.  Id. 
97 See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garett, 871 F. Supp. 381, 388-89 
(S.D. Cal. 1994).  The court found the defendant attorneys liable, stating that “a secondary 
actor may be primarily liable under section 10(b) when the actor’s alleged participation 
consists mainly of drafting and editing an offering document.”  Id. at 389.  Additionally, the 
court emphasized that a secondary actor “may be liable for direct violation of the rule if its 
participation if the misrepresentation is direct.”  Id. (quoting S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 
F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982)).  As for the accountants in question, the court ignored the 
fact that the reports were uncertified, arguing that a flexible test was necessary to 
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has also indicated that an inherent role or relationship of a secondary 
actor to the primary violator of § 10(b) may also make the secondary 
actor primarily liable.98   
However, no other circuit has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard.99  In fact, the Substantial Participation test is often viewed by 
critics as over-expansive and as having the effect of placing liability on 
actors having only small roles.100  Also, the test is criticized for being too 
vague and as having an unstable and imprecise application.101  Another 
principal criticism of the Substantial Participation test is that it does not 
                                                                                                             
determine whether a primary violation under § 10(b) had occurred.  Musick, 871 F. Supp. at 
389. 
98 In Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., the court found that the “defendants’ roles 
as analysts, investment bankers and business advisors with extensive contacts with 
Hollywood defendants, superior access to non-public information and participation in both 
drafting and decision-making is sufficient to establish a triable primary liability claim 
under § 10(b).”  Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Civil No. 95-1926-MA, 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5452, at *9 (D. Or. Mar. 7, 1997). 
99 See infra Part III.B; infra Part III.C; infra Part III.D (discussing other approaches circuits 
have chosen). 
100 See Wynne, supra note 84, at 1624.  Wynne notes that the Substantial Participation 
approach has a great disparity in regards to culpability.  Id.  The ultimate decision of 
whether to disclose and how to disclose belongs to the client, and not to an attorney or 
accountant, especially when the participation involves merely reviewing or discussing 
statements.  Id.  Further, requiring attorneys and accountants to shift through every aspect 
of their client’s business in order to detect omitted facts or misrepresentations is viewed as 
difficult if not impossible.  Id. 
101 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994).  
The Court emphasized that the uncertainty and excessive litigation caused by the aiding 
and abetting action could have “ripple effects.”  Id.  For example, the Court noted that 
smaller companies could find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals because a 
professional may fear that a newer or smaller company may not survive, generating 
possible securities litigation against the professional.  Id.  In addition, the “increased costs 
incurred by professionals because of the litigation and settlement costs under 10b-5 may be 
passed on to their client companies, and in turn incurred by the company’s investors, the 
intended beneficiaries of the statute.”  Id. (citing Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, 
Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 
DUKE L.J. 945, 948-66 (1993)).  See also Aymond, supra note 94, at 857 (noting that in some 
cases, it appears that the test has been defined based on its effect—whether or not the role 
of the players had a large or small impact).  See also Wynne, supra note 84, at 1625. Wynne 
emphasizes that the Substantial Participation test lacks objectivity, which results in 
unpredictability, which was a major concern of the Court in Central Bank.  Id.  There is no 
gauge for what type of participation actually constitutes liability.  Id.  Additionally, Wynne 
argues that Central Bank will have no meaning unless affirmative acts (making or creating) 
are involved for the purposes of primary liability. Id. Additionally, the Substantial 
Participation test is criticized as lacking a reliance requirement because the investors did 
not know that the secondary actor had anything to do with the misstatement or omission.  
Id. 
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include the reliance requirement for § 10(b).102  Critics note that by 
basing the standard of liability on a professional’s level of involvement, 
the test may punish ethically responsible behavior or cause a decrease in 
professional involvement altogether.103  Alternatively, praise for the 
Substantial Participation test is centered on its propensity to reach those 
indirectly involved.104  However, as a whole, the Substantial 
                                                 
102 In particular, the test is criticized on the basis of a lack of reliance by investors because 
the investors did not know that the secondary actor had anything to do with the 
misstatement or omission.  See Wynne, supra note 84, at 1624 (focusing on the inability of 
investors to rely if they do not know secondary actors had anything to do with the 
statement or omission).  See also De Leon, supra note 46, at 734.  De Leon notes that the costs 
of excessive litigation could be passed on to investors.  Additionally, there is a conflict in 
the courts over whether reliance can occur when a professional’s involvement with the 
alleged misrepresentation or omission is not known to the plaintiff or the market.  Id.  See, 
e.g., In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (recognizing that based on 
the FOMT, as long as the market relies upon or is affected by the alleged misstatements or 
omissions themselves, no separate reliance upon the professionals’ conduct is needed); 
Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 387 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that 
based on the FOMT, investors can recover damages for misstatements or omissions in 
documents that a third party professional allegedly helped prepare even if the professional 
is not named in the document and the public cannot otherwise attribute the misstatement 
or omissions to the professional). 
103 See Wynne, supra note 84, at 1629.  Wynne emphasizes that for fear of being held liable 
under the Substantial Participation test, lawyers may hesitate to offer advice to clients, 
enter into transactions with clients involved in the sale or purchase of securities, and 
accountants may be apprehensive to audit or enter into audit relationships with clients 
they fear are at risk for creating a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission.  Id. at 1625.  
Further, Wynne argues that investors would lose the benefit of having outside 
professionals involved in the process.  Id.  Also, the investors would be the ones who 
ultimately pay the price for increased attorneys’ and accountants’ fees if attorneys have to 
“over-lawyer” and accountants “over-account” in order to avoid liability.  Id.  See also 
Nicholson, supra note 70, at 102-03.  Noting that under the traditional lawyer-client 
structure, clients have the final say regarding whether particular public disclosures will 
occur, with changes in secondary liability, “enterprising and creative plaintiff’s counsel” 
are targeting lawyers for a failure to prevent or disclose their clients’ misconduct.  Id. at 
102-03.  As a result, Nicholson argues that lawyers’ concerns joined with ethical obligations 
and their roles as gatekeepers creates a “Hobson’s choice” for securities lawyers.  Id. at 103.  
Further, securities lawyers continue to be under the misapprehension that they could be 
subjected to disciplinary actions or disbarment if they reveal their clients’ fraudulent 
activity or conduct.  Id.  In fact, securities lawyers are exposed to professional liability 
under the federal securities laws for maintaining client confidences if it is done with the 
knowledge that the clients’ conduct would constitute a fraud.  Id.  As a result, lawyers must 
be given the discretion to disclose confidential information relating to client misconduct 
under the circumstances, and be able to avoid liability.  Id. 
104 See Marsella, supra note 82, at 445 (arguing that it seems to go against Central Bank to 
allow those who leave or make statements as “unaudited” to go free of liability).  But see 
Gold, supra note 74, at 707 (arguing that § 10(b) precludes a participation theory because 
secondary actors that participate generally do not “use” or “employ” a deceptive device). 
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Participation test is the least accepted and most criticized approach to 
primary liability of secondary actors.105 
B. The Bright Line Test 
In contrast to the broad reach of the Substantial Participation test, the 
strictest and narrowest standard is the Bright Line test. 106  Adopted by 
the Second Circuit in Wright v. Ernst & Young, the Bright Line test 
imposes liability upon secondary actors only when they actually make a 
material misstatement or omission that can be attributed to them at the 
time the original statement was made.107   
In Wright, the plaintiffs alleged that Ernst & Young, an accounting 
firm, provided false and misleading advice to the corporation, knowing 
that the advice would be passed on to investors through a press 
release.108  Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that because Ernst & Young 
                                                 
105 Currently, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to utilize the Substantial Participation 
test.  See, e.g., In re ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 970; Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment 
Corp., Civil No. 95-1926-MA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5452, at *9 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 1997). 
106 Many jurisdictions have recognized the Bright Line test.  See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade 
Intl., Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001); Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P, 152. F.3d 169 (2d 
Cir. 1998); S.E.C. v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 708 (D.N.J. 2005); In re Rural Cellular 
Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. 02-4893PAMRLE, 2004 WL 67651 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2004); D.E. & J 
Ltd. P’ship v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. Mich. 2003); In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. 
Litig., 230 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D. Mass. 2002); Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv., 137 F. 
Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Wis. 2001); Copland v. Grumet, 88 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D.N.J. 1999). 
107 In re MTC Elect. Tech. Shareholder Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).  As a 
result, under this test, the standard for secondary actors is the same for primary actors.  The 
“bright line” terminology was first used by the Tenth Circuit in Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. 
Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996).  Nonetheless, since Anixter, the standard adopted by the 
Second Circuit has been known as a “bright line” test.  Wynne, supra note 85, at 1617 n.76.  
However, this Note concludes that the Anixter test should be kept separate from the Bright 
Line test for purposes of analysis. 
108 Wright, 152 F.3d at 172.  At all relevant times, Ernst & Young was the outside auditor 
for BT Office Products, Inc. (“BT”), a corporation engaged in the distribution and sale of 
office products.  Id. at 171.  The complaint asserted that Ernst & Young violated the 
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act by orally approving BT’s materially false and 
misleading financial statements that BT in turn disseminated to the public in a January 30, 
1996 press release.  Id.  As BT expanded, its management engaged Ernst & Young to audit 
its year-end financial statements.  Id. at 171.  Ernst & Young issued audit opinions 
certifying the accuracy of BT’s financial statements for the years ending December 31, 1993 
and December 31, 1994.  Id.  Later, in July 1995, the firm updated and re-released the 
December 31, 1994 audit opinion as a “Report of Independent Auditors” for use in BT’s 
initial public offering prospectus, which included a statement of BT’s first quarter earnings 
for 1995.  Id. at 171-72.  Later, the firm began a new full scope review, and discovered an 
under-accrual of BT-Summit’s accounts payable and alerted BT management.  Id.  Upon 
consideration, however, Ernst & Young concluded that the under-accrual was not material 
and advised BT that it was probably a carryover of a similar under-accrual from the year 
before.  Id.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged that Ernst & Young signed off on BT Office 
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“signed-off” or approved the financial information within the press 
release, the market understood that the release was an implied statement 
by Ernst & Young that the financial information was accurate.109  
However, the Second Circuit found that not only must the actor actually 
make the misstatement, but the statement must be attributed to the actor 
at the time the statement was disseminated.110  Otherwise, such conduct 
is merely aiding and abetting.111   
As the most widely accepted test for primary liability of secondary 
actors, the Bright Line test has received praise for its narrow reading of 
                                                                                                             
Products’ 1995 financial statements and authorized a release of the year end results with 
full knowledge of the fact that the market would and did interpret the release of these 
figures as having been approved by Ernst & Young.  Id.  In late February and March of 
1996, it became apparent to both BT and Ernst & Young that the under-accrual problem at 
BT-Summit was more serious than previously believed. Id.  A further investigation 
revealed not only those BT-Summit employees used improper accounting techniques, but 
that substantial company funds had been embezzled.  Id.  In light of these discoveries, BT 
announced on March 28, 1996 that it was restating its 1995 financial results from a 
previously announced profit of $1.5 million to a loss of $200,000.  Id.  With that 
announcement, BT’s stock lost more than 25% of its value, injuring Wright and the other 
class members.  Id. 
109 Id. at 172.  The amended complaint alleged that the recklessness which caused class 
members to purchase stock at an artificially inflated price and later suffer injury once BT’s 
true financial picture emerged.  Id.  As a result, the plaintiffs claimed that because the 
market knew and relied on the fact that these financial statements were approved by Ernst 
& Young, the accounting firm was liable for losses suffered.  Id. at 171. 
110 Id.  at 173.  Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ arguments were foreclosed 
by Central Bank and by the Second Circuit’s decision in Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717 (2d 
Cir. 1997).  See also Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1205.  In Cascade, the Eleventh Circuit followed the 
Second Circuit’s lead and adopted the narrow version of the Bright Line test.  Id.  See supra 
notes 1-15 and accompanying text (discussing the facts from Cascade).  Addressing the 
allegations against the law firm, the court found that the misrepresentations were not 
attributable to the law firm.  Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1205.  Instead, the plaintiffs’ complaint 
was focused on the law firm’s significant role in drafting and creating the fraudulent letters 
and releases, and was therefore insufficient.  Id.  As a result, the court stated that holding 
the law firm liable would essentially result in the finding of aiding and abetting liability.  
Id.  The court also found that the law firm was not primarily liable for any alleged 
omissions.  Id. at 1206.  As for the accounting firm, because the plaintiffs had failed to show 
that any of the material misstatements or omissions were attributable to the accounting 
firm, the firm could not be primarily liable either.  Id. at 1211. 
111 Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.  Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ arguments 
were foreclosed by Central Bank and by the Second Circuit’s decision in Shapiro.  Id.  
Additionally, the court found that because § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 focus on fraud made in 
connection with the sale or purchase of securities, a defendant must “know or should 
know” that his representation would be communicated to investors.  Id.  However, 
although the court adopts Anixter’s language, it does not allow “knowing” or “having 
reason to know” to be a substitute for the requirement that the statement actually be 
attributed to the defendant.  Id. 
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§ 10(b).112  The test is viewed as offering great certainty and predictability 
in its application to professionals:  if the statement or omission is 
publicly attributable to the defendant, he may be liable.113  Also, 
proponents argue that by requiring attribution, the test upholds the 
reliance requirement of § 10(b).114  However, others argue that the 
approach provides a “safe harbor” for defendants who can craftily avoid 
having their names included in the misrepresentations.115   Nonetheless, 
the Bright line test remains the most popular approach in the circuits.116   
                                                 
112 Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1205; Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.  See also Haskins, supra note 44, at 
1107 (noting that this narrow reading is consistent with the current trend to narrow the 
scope of private securities litigation). 
113 Additionally, the test ensures precision and predictability by requiring that the 
defendant know or should have known that the misrepresentation or omission would be 
communicated to investors.  Frumento, supra note 78, at 975.  See also Rodney D. Chrisman, 
Note, “Bright Line,” “Substantial Participation,” or Something Else: Who is a Primary Violator 
Under Rule 10b-5?, 89 KY. L.J. 201, 223 (2000).  Chrisman argues that the Bright Line test is 
more faithful to the language of § 10(b) and Central Bank, and thus must be preferred to the 
Substantial Participation test, which Chrisman argues is little more than aiding and 
abetting liability under a different name.  Id.  However, Chrisman proposes that the Bright 
Line test needs to be modified in order to more clearly state what conduct is sufficient for a 
primary violation.  Id. at 223-24. 
114 See Wynne, supra note 84, at 1627.  Specifically, Wynne emphasizes that contrary to the 
Substantial Participation test, which may permit liability when there are no references to 
secondary actors in misstatements or documents with material omissions, the Bright Line 
test, by requiring attribution to the actor at dissemination, fulfills the reliance requirement 
of § 10(b).  Id.  See also De Leon, supra note 46, at 744-45.  De Leon finds that the best view of 
reliance is that it cannot occur unless the alleged misstatements or omissions were 
attributed to a third party professional.  Id.  Otherwise, neither plaintiffs nor the market 
will know about or be influenced by the professional’s conduct.  Id.  Further, De Leon 
rejects the suggestion that reliance on a professional can occur when the professional helps 
prepare misstatements or omissions because the market is still affected by those 
misstatements or omissions.  Id.  Such a theory would permit findings of reliance based on 
conduct constituting minimal aiding and abetting of primary violations by defendants.  Id. 
115 See Wynne, supra note 84, at 1625.  More specifically, actors who can keep their names 
off documents and therefore not publicly attributable can avoid liability entirely under the 
Bright Line approach, regardless of how intricately and substantially they were involved in 
the creation, review, or dissemination of that statement.  Id.  See also Robert A. Prentice, 
Locating that “Indistinct and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line Between Primary and Secondary 
Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 727-28 (1997).  Prentice notes that a 
secondary actor could approve of a client’s false statements or configure transactions so 
that clients can misleadingly report, yet not be liable because the statement excludes the 
secondary actor’s name.  Id.  As a result, the biggest weakness of the Bright Line approach 
is that it could allow egregious misconduct to go unpunished and serious injuries to go 
uncompensated.  Id. 
116 See cases cited supra note 106 (circuits that have recognized the Bright Line test). 
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C. The Anixter Test 
The Tenth Circuit, in Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., adopted a 
test that appeared to be similar to the Bright Line test, but is actually less 
stringent. 117  Specifically, in Anixter, the court did not require that the 
alleged misstatement be attributed to the defendant at the time of 
dissemination.118  Rather, the court found that secondary actors must 
themselves make a false or misleading statement or omission that they 
“know or should know” will reach investors.119   
                                                 
117 Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996).  Anixter was actually 
the first appellate case to discuss the distinctions between primary and secondary liability.  
Id.  In fact, Wright cited to the language in Anixter, but still required actual public 
attribution of the misstatement to the defendant.  Wright, 152 F.3d at 175. 
118 Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1225-26.  Home Stake Production Company had begun offering 
securities in the forms of interests in oil and gas programs in the 1970s.  Id. at 1218.  The 
securities represented units of participation in annual oil production subsidiaries Home-
Stake had established between 1964 and 1972, known as Program Operating Corporations 
(“Programs”).  Id.  The offerings purported to present investors both the promise of return 
on investment and attractive tax deductions of intangible drilling costs.  Id.  However, 
instead of going to oil development, the investments made in later year Programs were 
paid to earlier-year investors as “income” from the oil production.  Id.  Inevitably, the 
scheme collapsed, but only after millions of dollars had been lost.  Id.  Consequently, the 
first securities fraud case was filed in 1973, and had been the subject of four opinions by the 
10th Circuit before 1996.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit found that because the trial court judge 
gave the jury an instruction on “aiding and abetting,” the jury may have found liability on 
an invalid legal theory.  Id. at 1218-19.  In that case, the plaintiff Anixter, with others, had 
alleged violations of federal securities laws against Home-Stake’s directors, officer, outside 
attorneys, auditors, and other broker-dealers who had marketed its securities.  Id. at 1219.  
Plaintiffs alleged that the materials used to sell interests in the Programs contained 
misleading and untrue statements.  Id.  More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the 
materials indicated “rosy” reports and projections to investors, when very little oil was 
actually being produced, and that large “royalty” payments paid out to early investors 
came from later investors, and not from oil production.  Id. 
119 Id. at 1226.  Plaintiffs alleged that Home-Stake’s independent auditor was liable based 
on his alleged participation in the preparation and filing of the registration statements, 
program books, and prospectuses, and especially certification and opinion letters verifying 
Home-Stake’s overall health, made with knowledge of the false statements contained 
therein, or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statements.  Id.  
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the auditor’s behavior had constituted fraud by other 
defendants, principally the top officers and directors of Home-Stake.  Id.  Specifically, 
typical representations include certifications of financial statements and opinion letters.  Id.  
As a result, the court stated that “[a]n accountant’s false and misleading representations in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security, if made with the proper state of mind 
and if relied upon by those purchasing or selling a security, can constitute a primary 
violation.”  Id. 
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Further, the court found that the statement does not have to be made 
directly to the investor.120  As a result, even though the Bright Line test 
was based on the Anixter test, two distinct tests have emerged.121  Both 
versions require that secondary actors actually make the material 
misstatement or omission in question, but the Bright Line test from 
Wright has imposed the requirement that the action be attributed to the 
actor at the time the statement was disseminated, while the Anixter 
approach requires only that an actor “know or should know” that his 
misrepresentation or omission can reach potential investors.122  Because 
the Anixter test is often overlooked or considered as a mere variation of 
the Bright Line test, there is little criticism of the test.123   
D. The Creation Test  
The final and most recent standard for primary liability to emerge is 
a median approach between the Bright Line, Anixter, and Substantial 
Participation standards.124  The Creation test, proposed by the SEC and 
adopted by a district court in the Fifth Circuit, provides that a defendant 
                                                 
120 Id.  The court referenced several opinions finding that accountants have a special duty 
to disclose when they make statements on which they are aware the investors may rely.  Id. 
at 1226-28.  See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (finding that 
an accountant who audits the financial statement of a public company has a special public 
responsibility, in view of the great reliance investors place on financial statements; in fact, 
an auditor’s scrutiny of these statements is necessary to insure that the integrity of the 
securities markets); Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043-44 (11th Cir. 
1986) (finding that when a public auditing firm gives an opinion or certifies statements, it 
assumes a role carrying a relationship of trust with the public).  But see Shapiro v. Cantor, 
123 F.3d 717, 721 n.2 (2d. Cir. 1997) (criticizing Akin and Rudolph for not clearly 
distinguishing between primary liability and aiding and abetting liability). 
121 See supra note 117 and text accompanying notes 117-23 (recognizing that Anixter was 
the first case to discuss the distinctions between primary and secondary liability and that 
although Wright cited to the language in Anixter in developing the Bright Line test, the 
court in Wright required actual public attribution of the misstatement to the defendant). 
122 Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1225-26; Cascade, 256 F.3d at 1205; Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 
152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).  For support, the court in Anixter cited several cases 
supporting no requirement of first hand contact for liability.  See, e.g., SEC v. Holschuh, 694 
F.2d 130, 142 (7th Cir. 1982).  However, the court also emphasized that certain cases, 
specifically, ZZZZ Best and Cashman, that had allowed liability to attach without requiring 
a representation to be made by defendant, and that had reformulated the “substantial 
assistance” element of aiding and abetting into primary liability, were not comporting with 
Central Bank.  Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226. 
123 Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.  Although the Court adopted Anixter’s language, it did not 
allow “knowing” or “having reason to know” to be a substitute for the requirement that 
the statement actually be attributed to the defendant.  Id.  As a result, this Note treats the 
tests separately.  See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the 
Bright Line test, which are often made against the Anixter test as well). 
124 See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (discussing the criticisms and praise of 
the Creation test, finding it to be a median approach to the standards of liability). 
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should be liable when it “creates” a misrepresentation even if the 
defendant is not identified to investors.125   
The most utilized source of the Creation test is found in an amicus 
brief submitted by the SEC in Klein v. Boyd.126  In the Klein brief, the SEC 
proposed a test that would allow a person who “creates” a material 
misrepresentation, but who does not himself disseminate the 
misrepresentation, and whose name is not made known to investors, to 
be a primary violator subject to liability under § 10(b).127  In doing so, the 
                                                 
125 Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 18, Klein v. 
Boyd, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90, 136 (3d Cir. Apr. 1998) (Nos. 97-
1143, 97-1261) [hereinafter Klein Brief], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/ 
klein.txt. In the Klein Brief, the SEC argued that a person who makes a material 
misrepresentation, while acting with the requisite scienter, but who does not himself 
disseminate the misrepresentation, and whose name is not made known to the public, is a 
primary violator subject to liability.  Id. at 9.  In Klein, four investors in a failed limited 
partnership brought suit against a law firm that represented the partnership on the basis of 
its role in drafting allegedly fraudulent offering documents.  Id.  The law firm was retained 
to advise two principals in the formation of a business entity.  Id.  However, the new entity 
had begun operating by soliciting and receiving investors without waiting for the firm to 
draft the partnership agreement and other disclosure documents.  Id. at 9-10.  The law firm 
then advised its client that the agreement needed to be completed, that a disclosure letter 
had to be provided to investors, and that the investors needed time to reaffirm or rescind 
their investments.  Id.  However, in the end, the disclosure materials that were distributed 
failed to make numerous material disclosures to the investors.  Id. at 10-11.  The Fifth 
Circuit adopted the Creation test in In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. 
Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  The approach had been previously cited by Carley Capital 
Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 1998), before the decision 
was superseded by Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001).  Additionally, 
the SEC brief was the basis for the decision in Klein v. Boyd.  However, the decision in Klein 
was vacated within a month after its issuance, when an en banc panel agreed to take the 
case. 
126 See Nowicki, supra note 39, at 660 n.91 (noting that although Klein is no longer good 
law, the decision dealt with attorney liability in a less contrived way than the substantial 
participation or bright line approaches). 
127 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (“Private securities litigation is an indispensable 
tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon 
government action.  Such private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our 
capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, 
auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs.”).  The Supreme Court 
had also frequently recognized the important role private causes of action under the federal 
securities laws because they provide an effective weapon in the enforcement of the 
securities laws and are a necessary supplement to SEC action.  See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, 
Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 US. 299, 310 (1985).  The SEC also noted that Congress, in 
passing the PSLRA, affirmed the significance of private securities actions.  Klein Brief, supra 
note 125, at 2; see also Frumento, supra note 77, at 985.  Frumento notes that the point 
regarding the role of secondary actors was most clearly stated in an amicus brief submitted 
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in Central Bank, when it stated: 
“Without aiding and abetting liability, many of the experts, whose technical expertise plays 
a crucial role in the securities markets, and on whose credibility both buyers and sellers of 
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SEC argued against a rule requiring actual attribution to the defendant 
as a condition of liability.128  Specifically, the SEC argued that the Court 
in Central Bank did not indicate that “make” meant that only persons 
who sign documents or are otherwise identified to investors can be 
primarily liable because such a rule would be inconsistent with the 
§ 10(b) use of the words “directly or indirectly.”129   
Further, the SEC emphasized that the person who creates a 
misrepresentation for another “uses” it “indirectly” and to shield that 
person from liability would have the consequence of providing a “safe 
harbor” from liability for everyone except those identified with 
misrepresentations by name.130  Additionally, the SEC noted that 
“makes” as used by the Court in Central Bank does not have a precise 
meaning independent of the circumstances of a particular case.131  
                                                                                                             
securities depend, would be essentially immune from liability.”  Id.  (quoting Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in Support of Respondents, 
Central Bank of Denver. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854)). 
128 Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 3; see also Frumento, supra note 77, at 986 nn. 72-73 
(noting that the SEC tried to limit the impact of Central Bank in its lobbying to get the 
PSLRA passed and that the SEC has long used amicus briefs to influence judicial decisions 
affecting the federal securities laws). 
129 Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 12.  See also Frumento, supra note 77, at 995. Frumento 
argues that the SEC incorrectly interpreted the word “make” in Rule 10(b)-5 to include the 
word “create.”  Id.  Frumento, advocating a strict statutory analysis, compares the 
definitions of “create” and “make.”  Id.  He concludes that when analyzing which word is 
consistent with the “use or employ” language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, that “make” and 
not create is synonymous with the definition of “use,” meaning to “carry out.”  Id. at 996.  
As a result, Frumento argues that he who “makes” a misrepresentation is he who employs 
it to defraud, and that he has to communicate to the victim in order to induce reliance on 
the statement.  Id.  Conversely, a creation of a misrepresentation, without communication 
to a victim, is a “non-event.”  Id. 
130 Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 12.  In Central Bank, the SEC stated that creators of 
misrepresentations could escape liability as long as they concealed their identities, which 
promoted deception rather than on compliance with federal securities laws.  Brief for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10-
11, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-
854).  In other words, if those who created misrepresentations, but took care not to be 
identified publicly with the statements were held not liable, any party retained to prepare 
information for dissemination to investors, including lawyers, accountants, and public 
relations firms, could immunize themselves.  Id. 
131 Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 19.  See also Frumento, supra note 77, at 989.  Frumento 
notes that the SEC’s “proffer” of the Creation test had virtually the substance as the 
Substantial Participation rule.  Id.  Specifically, Frumento notes that “One who ‘creates a 
representation, acting . . . with others’ by definition ‘participates’ in the creation, and then 
the ‘substantiality’ of that participation inevitably comes back into question.”  Id. at 988-89.  
Additionally, Frumento notes that the SEC’s primary purpose was not to have its 
suggested language adopted, but rather to persuade the court to reject the requirement of 
public attribution.  Id. 
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Consequently, the SEC proposed that the standard for primary liability 
of secondary actors defines “make” as “create.”132   
Most recently, the SEC brief in Klein was the foundation for the 
adoption of the Creation test by the Southern District of Texas in In re 
Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation.133  In its 
decision, the district court found that a person need not initiate the 
misrepresentation, sign the document containing the misrepresentation, 
disseminate the misrepresentation, or even be identified in the document 
containing the misrepresentation.134  Relying heavily on the SEC’s brief, 
the court emphasized that Central Bank only required reliance on a 
misrepresentation, not that a particular person made a 
misrepresentation.135  The court also rejected the Substantial 
Participation test because of the uncertainty as to what kind of conduct 
and circumstances constituted “substantial participation” or “intricate 
involvement.”136   
                                                 
132 Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 17.  The SEC also emphasized that its standard would be 
easily applicable in situations where many parties were concerned, which frequently 
occurs with complex securities litigation.  Id. at 17.  See also Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (noting that in complex securities 
litigation, multiple parties are often involved).  Additionally, the SEC’s proposed approach 
provided that the actor did not have to be the initiator of the misrepresentation to be 
primarily liable.  Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 17.  “[I]f he or she writes misrepresentations 
for inclusion in a document to be given to investors, even if the idea for those 
misrepresentations came from someone else,” he or she may be primarily liable.  Id. at 17-
18.  Conversely, if a person who prepares a truthful and complete portion of a document, 
he or she would not be liable as a primary violator for misrepresentations in other portions 
of the document; even if that person knew of the documents, he would not have created 
those misrepresentations and therefore would not be liable.  Id. 
133 See Frumento, supra note 77, at 984 (noting that the Enron court cited the Klein brief for 
its inspiration for the creation theory). 
134 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 585-86 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002). In Enron, the plaintiffs, purchasers of Enron’s securities, alleged that the 
defendants, which were accounting firms, law firms, and banks, were liable for making 
false statements or failing to disclose adverse facts and/or participating in a scheme to 
defraud purchasers of Enron’s public securities.  Id. at  564-65. 
135 Id. at 587-88.  See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (allowing liability for anyone who 
“makes a misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies”).  
Additionally, the court in Enron gave merit to the SEC’s argument that the Bright Line test 
would provide a “safe harbor for anonymous creators of misrepresentations.”  Enron, 235 
F. Supp. 2d at 588.  The SEC also noted: “In sum, by providing a safe harbor for anonymous 
creators of misrepresentations, a rule that imposes liability only when a person is identified 
with a misrepresentation would place a premium on concealment and subterfuge rather 
than on compliance with the federal securities laws.”  Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 13. 
136 Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 585.  In fact, the Enron court was adopting the SEC’s 
argument that the Substantial Participation test would encompass lesser degrees of 
involvement than Central Bank allowed.  See Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 19. 
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Further, in assessing the validity of the SEC’s approach, the court in 
Enron followed traditional administrative law principles and gave the 
SEC substantial deference.137  The court found that the SEC’s approach in 
Klein was balanced in its concern for defrauded investors and 
unnecessarily harassed defendants.138  Nonetheless, many critics have 
contended that the SEC is subject to political pressures and should not be 
afforded such extensive deference.139   
Because it is a median approach, the criticisms and praise for the 
Creation test examine how well the Creation test resolves the problems 
of the Bright Line, Anixter, and Substantial Participation approaches.  
The dominant praise for the Creation test is that it avoids the “safe 
harbor” that the Bright Line test allows.140  Scholars have also noted that 
there is ample legislative history to support affording the SEC deference 
in regard to its interpretations of secondary actor liability.141  In 
                                                 
137 Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 588.  Noting that because § 10(b) expressly delegated rule-
making authority to the agency, which the SEC exercised in creating 10b-5, the court 
offered a great deal of deference and weight to the SEC’s interpretation.  Id.  Specifically, 
the court notes that such deference is reasonable because the SEC’s interpretation is not 
“arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id.  See, e.g., Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (noting that the views of administrative agencies 
constituted a “body of experience and informed judgment” that courts should resort to for 
guidance). 
138 Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 590-91.  See also Gold, supra note 74, at 693.  Gold discusses 
the interpretive problem of judicial deference to the SEC, specifically in regards to the 
implied private right of action and Rule 10b-5.  Id.  Gold argues that Central Bank was an 
instance of non-deference to the SEC, in which the Court rejected the SEC’s arguments for a 
broad interpretation that would permit aiding and abetting liability.  Id. at 696.  Further, 
Gold notes that the extent to which the SEC’s interpretation of the scope of conduct 
prohibited by § 10(b) merits deference is dependent on the type of action: for private 
securities litigation, such deference is not called for, even if it were appropriate in the 
enforcement context.  Id. at 700.  As a result, Gold argues that § 10(b) was meant to limit 
private actions, and consequently, if deference is allowed, it cannot be allowed such that 
private action liability would exceed the intended scope of § 10(b).  Id. 
139 Facciola, supra note 42, at 6.  Facciolo argues that the SEC experiences political 
pressure when it adopts a position unpopular with the financial services industry.  Id.  As 
an example, he references when SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt attempted to separate the 
auditing and consulting functions of major accounting firms, but faltered under intense 
lobbying pressure by accounting firms.  Id.  The result was a weakened final version of the 
rules.  Id.  Facciolo also emphasizes that the SEC’s budget ultimately is subject to 
Congressional control.  Id. 
140 Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 587-88.  See also Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 13.  The SEC 
argued that whereas the Bright Line test requires the attribution of a statement to a 
particular defendant, the Creation test is broader and closes the gap by which defendants 
could avoid liability by strategically keeping their names removed from statements and 
documents.  Id. 
141 Haskins, supra note 44, at 1114.  Basing his theory on the approach from Carley Capital, 
Haskins proposes that “an actor would be liable if, acting alone or with others, it creates a 
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particular, the broad delegation to the SEC allows it to reach conduct 
that would distort the market or affect market integrity.142  Finally, some 
critics find that the Creation test is the most consistent with Central Bank 
because it holds defendants who are directly involved liable.143   
Each approach to secondary actor liability is distinct, with different 
strengths and weaknesses.144  Part IV examines the approaches to 
secondary actor liability in light of the reliance requirement under 
§ 10(b), the goals of the Exchange Act, and the policies from Central 
Bank.145  
IV.  ANALYSIS:  DEVELOPING A NAVIGABLE STANDARD OF LIABILITY 
Clearly, the varying approaches taken by the several circuits produce 
significantly different results.146  Yet the need for certainty in the field of 
securities litigation continues to grow.147  In determining which test best 
serves the securities laws, there are several essential points of analysis.148  
                                                                                                             
misrepresentation that a reasonable investor would attribute in part or in whole to the 
secondary actor.”  Id.  Haskins advocates adding the requirement of attribution to the 
“Creation test” because he argues that otherwise, the reliance requirement requires that a 
statement must be attributable in some way to the actor involved.  Id.  As a result, he 
argues his theory would not hold liable individuals who were merely “standing around.”  
Id. 
142 See Thel, supra note 43, at 462.  See also Haskins, supra note 44, at 1115 n.212.  Haskins 
argues that his proposed approach is well within the SEC’s authority and the legislative 
history of § 10(b), which indicates that Congress wanted to delegate broad authority to the 
SEC and to reach conduct that would distort the market.  Id. 
143 See Aymond, supra note 94, at 860.  Aymond advocates the Creation test as articulated 
in Carley Capital because it requires more than the Substantial Participation test, which 
more precisely excludes aiders and abettors, while it also ensures that the creators and 
authors of misrepresentations are held liable.  Id.  (citing Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & 
Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998)).  However, some scholars have 
made textualist arguments that “make” as used in Central Bank, does not mean “create.”  
See Frumento, supra note 77, at 995.  Frumento utilizes strict definitions of the words “use,” 
“make,” and “create” to argue that while “create” and “make” both suggest bringing 
something new into existence, only “make” can be used with “use” (as it is in § 10(b)) to 
mean “carry out.”  Id. at 996. 
144 See supra Part III (discussing the various approaches to secondary actor liability). 
145 See infra Part IV (examining the circuits’ approaches to secondary actor liability in 
light of the reliance requirement of § 10(b), the goals of the Exchange Act, and the policies 
articulated in Central Bank). 
146 See supra Part III.A (discussing the Substantial Participation test); supra Part III.B 
(discussing the Bright Line test); supra Part III.C (discussing the Anixter test); supra Part 
III.D (discussing the Creation test). 
147 See Fisch, supra note 83, at 1304 (discussing factors leading up to Congress’ passing of 
the PSLRA); Oldham, supra note 53, at 1021-22 (discussing the PSLRA). 
148 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the relationship of the FOMT and secondary actor 
liability); infra Part IV.B (discussing the need for the secondary liability standard to protect 
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First, since it is generally the most litigated and most challenging aspect 
of private securities litigation, each test should comport with the reliance 
requirement of § 10(b).149  Second, as many scholars have noted, any 
legitimate test for secondary actor liability must meet the purpose and 
goals of the Exchange Act:  the test should increase market integrity and 
investor confidence.150  Additionally, the SEC’s proposals regarding 
§ 10(b) are due some level of deference.151  Finally, the goals and policies 
articulated by the Court in Central Bank—predictability of outcomes and 
deterrence of frivolous lawsuits—should be taken into consideration 
when choosing a particular standard.152  Part IV examines how well the 
four tests measure up against these concerns.153   
A. Reliance:  The Fraud on the Market Theory and Secondary Actor Liability 
Based on the Court’s reasoning in Basic and the federal courts’ 
interpretations of the FOMT, the public nature of representations is key 
to adequately preserving the reliance requirement under § 10(b).154  As a 
result, in proving reliance on misrepresentations or omissions made by 
secondary actors, the preferred approach to primary liability for 
secondary actors should recognize that reliance is on the 
misrepresentation, and not on the actor himself or even the investor’s 
knowledge of the actor’s participation.155   
                                                                                                             
market integrity); infra Part IV.C (discussing the need for the standard to provide certainty 
and predictability). 
149 See infra Part IV.A. 
150 See also S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934) (noting that the purpose of the Exchange Act 
in hopes that federal regulation would ensure an honest securities market and promote 
investor confidence); Siamas, supra note 43, at 900. 
151 See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Enron court’s decision to 
give deference to the SEC in its interpretation of § 10(b)’s private right of action). 
152 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of predictability 
and certainty articulated in Central Bank). 
153 See infra Part IV. 
154 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1383, at 11 (1934)) (quoting Congress’ 
concern regarding the effect of public representations on investor decisions).  Also, the 
FOMT is a widely accepted, well-grounded analysis accepted by most courts as a working 
analysis of the reliance requirement of 10b-5 and § 10b.  See Oldham, supra note 53, at 1101 
n.106 (discussing the courts’ application of ECMH to the FOMT); Wynne, supra note 84, at 
1627 (criticizing the Substantial Participation test’s treatment of the reliance requirement 
and praising the Bright Line test for requiring attribution); supra Part II.B.2 (discussing 
FOMT); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Court’s decision in Basic v. Levinson). 
155 This is based on the idea stated by the court in Enron that reliance is present in a 
misstatement, whether the specific individual who created it is known to the public or not.  
In re Enron Corporation Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587-88 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002). 
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1. Reasonable Investors Expect that Professionals Are Involved 
Reasonable investors not only know, but expect that outside 
professionals are involved in the creation and preparation of statements 
disseminated to the public.156  To suggest that merely because the name 
of the creator and preparer of the statement is not on the document itself 
somehow disables the statement from affecting the market contradicts 
the primary assumption of the ECMH.157  It is the misstatement itself 
which affects the price of the stock.158  Further, even when the name of 
the attorney or accountant involved in the preparation of a document is 
unknown, the market reflects reasonable investors’ assumptions that 
outside professionals were involved in the preparation and creation of 
the statements.159  Such involvement is publicly known, and therefore, 
publicly relied on in connection with the misrepresentation.160   
As a result, although the Bright Line test requires attribution, and is 
often praised for preserving the reliance requirement,161 it fails to 
recognize the greater role of reliance on information in the public 
market.162  In particular, the Bright Line’s narrow approach focuses only 
on public, express reliance.  It ignores the implied reliance that 
professionals were intricately involved in the preparation and creation of 
statements.163  As a result, the Bright Line test fails to recognize that 
                                                 
156 See also Coffee, supra note 19, at 308-09 (discussing the role of gatekeepers); Sale, supra 
note 70, at 139-40 (discussing the role of professionals as intermediaries in the securities 
market). 
157 See generally Fischel, supra note 55 and accompanying text; Thel, supra note 43 and 
accompanying text (describing the various forms of the ECMH, and focusing on how the 
effect of public information on the stock price is the basis for the FOMT). 
158 See Fischel, supra note 55, at 908 (noting that the FOMT interprets reliance as meaning 
reliance on the integrity of the market price rather than on the disclosure). 
159 Id. at 911 (describing empirical studies on the effect of the semi-strong versions of the 
ECMH–that indicate that market prices are likely to reflect info about securities). 
160 It is contrary to common sense to suggest that the reliance is primarily on the actor 
whose name is attached to the statement rather than on the statement itself and the implied 
public assumptions that accompany it.  See supra Part II.A (discussing the reliance 
requirement under § 10(b)). 
161 See Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that courts 
must require attribution to an actor, because to find otherwise would circumvent the 
reliance requirements of the Exchange Act, as “reliance only on representations made by 
others cannot itself form the basis of liability”).  See also In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. 
Supp. 960, 973 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (recognizing as long as the market relies on the alleged 
misstatements or omissions, no separate reliance upon the secondary actor is necessary); 
Haskins, supra note 44, at 1114 (arguing that reliance requires attribution). 
162 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988)  (discussing the role of reliance in § 10(b) 
actions); Wright, 152 F.3d at 175 (discussing the attribution requirement). 
163 See Nicholson, supra note 70, at 100 (discussing professionals’ involvement in creation 
and preparation of securities documents); Sale, supra note 70, at 139-40 (noting that the 
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information created by unknown individuals could and will affect the 
market.164   
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Substantial Participation 
test fails to preserve the integrity of the reliance requirement because it 
allows liability for individuals who may have had little contact with the 
representation.  For example, under this test, an attorney could be liable 
for merely editing a document.165  In contrast, the Creation test requires 
more action by secondary actors:  to be liable, the actors must have made 
or created the misstatements even if they were able to avoid having their 
names attributed to their statements or omissions.166  As a result, the 
reliance is on the representation made by the unnamed actor, and not on 
an uninvolved third party.167   
Further, the Creation test emphasizes the significance of the public 
nature of misstatements.168  In adopting the FOMT in Basic, the Court 
emphasized that all public information affects the market, so that prices 
reflect all publicly available information.169  As a result, reliance under 
                                                                                                             
securities system was based on the existence of professionals “charged with cleansing 
issuer disclosures in order to provide transparency”).  Additionally, as the Court noted in 
Basic, open public markets are based on the idea that the market brings about fair prices 
because of the competing judgments of buyers and sellers.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 246.  
Consequently, “hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of 
the markets as indices of real value.”  Id.  See also Prentice, supra note 115, at 727-28 (noting 
that a secondary actor could approve and draft misstatements and not be liable because the 
statements did not include the actor’s name); Wynne, supra note 84, at 1625 (discussing that 
secondary actors’ “slyness” immunizes them from liability under the Bright Line test). 
164 See supra note 70 (emphasizing the effect of professional involvement on the market). 
165 It is clear that the Substantial Participation test does not require that actors actually 
make the misstatement in question.  See, e.g., Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., 
Civil No. 95-1926-MA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5452 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 1997) (finding liability 
based on defendants’ roles as analysts, investment bankers, and business advisors for 
defendants).  But see Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding 
that the court in ZZZZ Best, by not requiring reliance, was finding primary liability on 
substantially the same grounds as aiding and abetting had once been).  Further, the 
Substantial Participation test allows liability against actors whose participation ranges from 
merely reviewing a document to editing the document.  See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks 
Inc. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding liability for accountants that had only 
extensively reviewed and discussed a document containing misstatements). 
166 See Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1225 (noting that courts that advocate the Bright Line test have 
found that Central Bank’s conclusion that reliance only on representations made by others 
cannot form the basis of liability makes the Substantial Participation test not viable). 
167 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587-88 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002) (noting that Central Bank only required reliance on a misrepresentation, not that 
a particular person made a misrepresentation). 
168 See supra Part III.D (discussing the Creation test). 
169 See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (noting that market professionals 
generally consider most publicly announced statements about companies, thereby affecting 
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the FOMT assumes that the plaintiff relied on material public 
misrepresentations and that reasonable investors would have done the 
same.170  Similarly, just as the FOMT supports the presumption that 
reasonable investors rely on stock prices to be a reflection of the stock’s 
value, the same investors rely on companies to involve accountants and 
attorneys in the process of preparing and developing statements 
regarding various material aspects of the company.171  Therefore, an 
attribution requirement is unnecessary. 
2. Reliance Under § 10(b) Requires Knowledge that a Statement Could 
Go Public 
The emphasis in Basic on the public nature of the statement indicates 
that the actor’s knowledge that his statement would be publicly 
disseminated is relevant as well.  First, the Substantial Participation test 
fails this requirement.  It often reaches actors who had no intention or 
knowledge that their actions would lead to the dissemination of 
information to investors, finding liability for individuals who merely 
review and edit a document.172  Similarly, the Creation test has no 
requirement that the creator of the document knew or should have 
known that the document or statements he created would go public.173   
                                                                                                             
stock prices).  Consequently, plaintiffs did not need to show specific reliance on any 
particular misstatement or omission or on any individual involved with that misstatement 
or omission.  Id. 
170 Id. at 248 n.27 (listing the factors a plaintiff must prove in order to use the FOMT, 
which includes that the misrepresentation must “induce a reasonable, relying investor to 
misjudge the value of the shares”).  See also Martin, supra note 53, at 418 and accompanying 
text (discussing the propositions of the FOMT).  Further, reasonable investors are not as 
concerned with the signatures and attributions on the document as much as the material 
representations made within the document.  See Siamas, supra note 43, at 900 and 
accompanying text (emphasizing that the Exchange Act was passed with the belief that 
public disclosure of material company information would enable investors to make 
knowledgeable decisions, thereby implying that investors rely on the public information 
that is disseminated to them). 
171 The FOMT and ECMH are based on the idea that prices reflect publicly available 
information.  See Fischel, supra note 55, at 911; Martin, supra note 53, at 418. 
172 See infra Part IV.B.2 (arguing that the standard for the Substantial Participation test is 
vague and offers no indication as to what level of participation is required for liability).  See 
also Aymond, supra note 94, at 857 (noting that it appears the Substantial Participation test 
is implemented sometimes for the effect of the defendant’s actions, i.e. whether or not the 
role of the players had a large or small impact). 
173 Instead, the Creation test only requires that a person create a material 
misrepresentation, and has no requirement that the person know or should have known 
that the misrepresentation would eventually be distributed or that the public had any 
knowledge of the person’s involvement in the creation of the misrepresentation.  See supra 
Part III.C. 
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However, the Bright Line test’s express prohibition of liability 
against those who knew or should have known that their statement 
would be made publicly known is more problematic.174  By creating a 
safe harbor as discussed above, the Bright Line test effectively denies 
recovery against those who knew their statements would go public, but 
were able to keep their name and participation secret.175  The Anixter test 
closes the safe harbor by allowing liability if the maker of the statement 
knew or should have known the document could be made public.176  
Because the individual making the statement knows of its purpose, 
intent, and use, it is likely that the maker would be aware of how, when, 
and to whom the document would be distributed.177  As a result, the 
Anixter test’s knowledge component effectively preserves the knowledge 
aspect of the reliance requirement.   
As noted above, there are two primary aspects to the reliance 
requirement.  First, reliance should be on the misrepresentation and not 
on the actor to whom the misrepresentation is attributed.178  Second, a 
knowledge requirement, that the actor knew or should have known the 
misstatement would go public, is also necessary.  However, specific 
attribution, as required by the Bright Line test, is unnecessary since it is 
reasonable for investors to assume that professionals are involved in the 
creation of such important company statements.  As a result, each test 
currently used by the circuits needs some alteration to meet the 
objectives of the reliance requirement. 
                                                 
174 Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that not only 
must an actor actually make the misstatement, but the statement must be attributed to the 
actor at the time the statement was disseminated).  Conversely, the Anixter form of the 
Bright Line test, by not requiring attribution, and by emphasizing the “know” or “should 
have known” standards, could effectively maintain the reliance requirement. 
175 See supra Part III.B (discussing criticisms and arguments against the Bright Line test 
because it allows a “safe harbor” for actors who can keep their names from being publicly 
associated with misrepresentations). 
176 See supra Part III.C (discussing the application of the Anixter test). 
177 Nicholson, supra note 70, at 100 (discussing professionals’ involvement in creation and 
preparation of securities documents). 
178 As a result, the emphasis should be on the public nature of the misrepresentation.  
Supra Part IV.A (analyzing the standards for secondary actor liability in terms of the 
reliance requirement of § 10(b)). 
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B. Secondary Actor Liability Within the Legislative Purpose of the Exchange 
Act  
The relative consistency of each test with the legislative purpose of 
the Exchange Act should also be considered.179  More specifically, 
because the Exchange Act was passed to maintain a high level of 
integrity and to ensure protection against fraudulent schemes, common 
sense suggests that liability for misleading statements should exist for 
those predominantly involved in creating those public statements, 
regardless of whether or not their names are publicly associated with the 
misstatements.180  As a result, denying recovery against those who 
perpetrate a fraud by creating a misrepresentation affects market 
integrity.181   
The Bright Line and Anixter tests have the effect of undermining the 
goals of the Exchange Act by limiting recovery from those who were 
centrally involved in the perpetration of a fraud on the market.182  At the 
other end of the spectrum, the unclear Substantial Participation test is 
overbroad and risks discouraging professionals from offering quality 
advice to their clients because of a fear of being found liable.183  
However, the Creation approach maintains market integrity by offering 
a clear standard of liability aimed at those centrally involved in 
misrepresentations to investors:  professionals can carry out their duties 
with the awareness and knowledge of what actions could lead to 
                                                 
179 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) 
(emphasizing the legislative history and purpose of the Exchange Act in its analysis of 
aiding/abetting cause of action).  See also S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934) (emphasizing that 
Congress passed the Exchange Act in hopes that federal regulation would ensure an honest 
securities market and promote investor confidence); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life 
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (stating that one of the basic philosophies of 
the Exchange Act is disclosure and creation and maintenance of a post-issuance securities 
market that is free from fraudulent practices). 
180 Dennin, supra note 43, at 2648 (discussing the original purpose of the Securities Acts.  
See also Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680 (emphasizing disclosure and creation of a market free 
from fraudulent practices as primary purposes of the Exchange Act); Sale, supra note 70, at 
140 (emphasizing that the involvement of lawyers, accountants, and other bankers, is key 
to the assumption that disclosures are clean and accurate and lead to the functioning of an 
efficient market). 
181 See Wynne, supra note 84, at 1625 (discussing the implications of the safe harbor left 
open by the Bright Line test). 
182 This criticism applies to both tests because it’s based on the “make” requirement 
versus the “create” requirement.  In both cases, the “make” requirement is too ambiguous.  
But see Frumento, supra note 77, at 995 (arguing that “make” means to “use” or “carry out” 
and is incorrectly used by the SEC in its Creation test). 
183 See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the Substantial Participation’s effect of chilling 
professional involvement in the securities markets). 
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liability.184  Additionally, Congress created the SEC with the purpose of 
providing for a well-informed and specialized body to deal with the 
complicated matters of securities laws.185  Some level of deference is due 
to SEC interpretations of § 10(b), a statute it administers, and under 10b-
5, a rule it promulgated.186   
1. The Standard for Secondary Actor Liability Should Deter Fraudulent 
Schemes 
In order to preserve market integrity, the appropriate test for 
primary liability for secondary actors should deter fraudulent 
schemes.187  First, the Bright Line test’s failure to meet the purpose of the 
1934 Act is its greatest criticism.188  By creating a “safe harbor,” whereby 
conniving individuals can conspire to keep their names off of documents 
and unassociated with various statements, the test actually encourages 
the fraudulent scheme behavior that the Exchange Act sought to 
prevent.189  Such fraudulent schemes are more likely to develop if 
liability revolves around a circus act of avoiding having an attorney’s or 
                                                 
184 See infra note Part IV.C (discussing the predictability of the outcomes generated by the 
Creation test). 
185 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2000) (establishing the SEC); Grundfest, supra note 39, at 1018 
(noting that Congress gave the SEC great power whenever confronted with conflict and 
that the SEC was created as an independent entity with its single concern being the 
problem of securities regulation). 
186 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 588 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002) (articulating its reasons for granting deference to the SEC’s interpretation of 
§ 10(b) and 10b-5); Nowicki, supra note 39, at 685-86 (arguing that the SEC’s interpretation 
of “makes” pertains to the SEC’s interpretation of its own regulation and should be 
adopted). 
187 See supra Part II.A (discussing § 10(b)’s goal of deterring fraudulent schemes). 
188 See Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 12-16.  See also Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (agreeing 
with the SEC and rejecting the Bright Line test because it has the unfortunate and 
unwarranted consequence of providing a safe harbor from liability for everyone except 
those identified with the misrepresentations by name); Siamas, supra note 43, at 918 n.131 
(advocating the Substantial Participation test because it allows the courts to punish fraud, 
no matter where it occurs); Aymond, supra note 94, at 858 (stating that Bright Line Test 
absolves from liability actors who use semantics to get around term “make”). 
189 See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31, 246 (1985) (discussing Congress’ intent in 
passing the Exchange Act).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (emphasizing that 
investors need honesty and honest markets).  However, this criticism does not apply to the 
Anixter approach; rather, it only applies to the Bright Line test, because it requires 
attribution.  Thel, supra note 43, at 427-28 (discussing the purpose of the Exchange Act, 
which was not to create a completely educated investor, but rather to protect investors 
from fraudulent schemes). 
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banker’s name on a document that he created and manipulated for 
public dissemination.190   
Consequently, the Bright Line test is clearly in contradiction with the 
Exchange Act’s goal of increasing market integrity.191  In contrast, 
because the Anixter test only requires knowledge that a statement would 
go public, and not attribution of the statement by the public to the actor, 
the test does not have the same adverse effect on market integrity.192  The 
Creation test also closes the safe harbor left open by the Bright Line test 
because it does not require attribution.193  As a result, both the Creation 
and Anixter tests avoid the likelihood that schemes and fraudulent 
behavior would occur, better preserving market integrity.  
2. The Appropriate Test for Liability Should Provide a Navigable 
Standard and Predictable Outcomes 
Not only should the appropriate test deter fraudulent activity, but 
the standard must be clearly defined and easily understandable.194  Both 
the Bright Line and Anixter tests fail to adequately define “make,” and 
are generally applied too narrowly, protecting those primarily 
responsible for the creation and preparation of misleading information 
meant for investors by preventing liability.195  In contrast, the Substantial 
Participation test overreaches.196  First, because the standard is vague, the 
Substantial Participation test may have the effect of discouraging 
professionals from effectively counseling their clients regarding 
disclosures to investors.197  More specifically, if attorneys, accountants, 
and auditors are unclear as to what activities may result in liability, those 
professionals may choose to participate less in the securities process, 
thereby decreasing the quality of information passed on to investors.198  
                                                 
190 See Prentice, supra note 115, at 727-28 (noting that the biggest weakness of the Bright 
Line test is its potential to allow egregious wrongdoing). 
191 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994).  
See also Wynne, supra note 84, at 1625 (noting that the Bright Line approach contradicts the 
holding in Central Bank because it allows those who are centrally and fundamentally 
involved to go free); supra Part II.A (discussing the purposes of the federal securities laws). 
192 See supra Part III.C (discussing the Anixter test). 
193 See supra Part III.B (discussing the Bright Line’s “safe harbor”). 
194 See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the need for a clear standard of liability under § 10(b) 
in order to encourage professional involvement). 
195 See supra Part III.B (discussing the Bright Line’s “safe harbor”). 
196 See Wynne, supra note 84, at 1624 (noting that the Substantial Participation approach 
has a degree of disparity in terms of culpability). 
197 See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 70, at 117. 
198 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994) 
(emphasizing that the cost of over-lawyering might be spread to investors, the intended 
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Such a result would be contrary to the Exchange Act’s promotion of 
accurate disclosure.199   
Additionally, investors generally benefit from the involvement of 
outside professional consultation to companies.200  But, the integrity of 
the market would be compromised as higher attorneys’ fees and 
accountants’ fees increase to cover the cost of the over-lawyering and 
over-accounting that could become rampant as a result of the application 
of the Substantial Participation test.201  Further, allowing such a minimal 
standard for recovery could also discourage ethical behavior.202  If 
attorneys and accountants are fearful that any affirmative action they 
take may later make them susceptible to liability, they may remain aloof 
and do a poorer job of analyzing and interpreting information presented 
to them by their clients.203  Investors would suffer the loss of valuable 
professional services, traditionally provided by accountants and lawyers, 
in reviewing, editing, and adjusting statements before they are made 
known to the public.204  In other words, the result would be a chilling 
effect on professional involvement:  professionals would likely offer 
                                                                                                             
beneficiaries of the Exchange Act).  See also De Leon, supra note 46, at 742; Wynne, supra 
note 84, at 1624 (discussing the possibilities of excessive litigation if the Substantial 
Participation approach was utilized). 
199 See Siamas, supra note 43, at 900 (discussing the Exchange Act’s emphasis on 
disclosure and fairness). 
200 See Nicholson, supra note 70, at 100 (discussing the important roles of gatekeepers in 
the securities markets). “Securities lawyers simply are not peripheral players in the 
securities markets.  They do more than act as simple scriveners—drafting documents solely 
on the basis of information provided by clients, or limiting review of client documents.”  Id. 
at 117.  Nicholson goes on to argue that the lack of a consistent rule regarding professional 
liability leads lawyers to ineffective representation.  Id. at 116-17. 
201 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 181 (discussing the “ripple effects” of an ambiguous 
standard for liability).  See also supra note 204. 
202 See Nicholson, supra note 70, at 116-17. Nicholson notes that uncertainty about the law 
governing professional liability makes lawyers “unnecessarily cautious” during the course 
of their client representations.  Id.  Additionally, the “lawyers’ preoccupation with being 
viewed as having participated in their clients’ misconduct is only heightened by the tension 
of balancing the lawyers’ ethical duties to their clients against the obligation of market 
gatekeeper.” Id. 
203 Wynne, supra note 84, at 1624 (discussing the possible chilling effect on professional 
involvement caused by the Substantial Participation test). 
204 Although the market wants to encourage the involvement of professionals, such as 
lawyers and accountants, it would be unreasonable and virtually impossible to require 
lawyers to review every document issued to the public by their clients in search of possible 
fraudulent statements.  See Wynne, supra note 84, at 1624 (observing that the decision of 
whether to disclose and how to disclose belongs to the client and that requiring attorneys 
and accountants to shift through every aspect of their client’s business in order to detect 
omitted facts or misrepresentations is viewed as difficult if not impossible).  Id. 
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fewer services or charge inflated rates to cover the risk of increased 
liability.   
In comparison, the Creation test sets out a much clearer standard for 
professionals by requiring that an actor “create” or “make” or 
“construct” a misstatement.205  Whereas the Substantial Participation test 
may lead to a decrease in professional consultation and advice, the 
Creation test encourages such professional involvement because 
professionals would realize they could offer services without having to 
review, edit, and investigate all of their clients’ documents to search for 
material misstatements or omissions.206  Secondary actors would only be 
liable for public misstatements for which they are active creators and not 
for documents that they are given no opportunity to check for possible 
§ 10(b) violations.207   
Overall, the Substantial Participation and Bright Line tests 
completely fail to implement the Exchange Act’s goal of preserving 
market integrity.208  The tests either inhibit professional participation or 
allow safe harbors for improper involvement.209  Also, the Anixter test, 
although it has no safe harbor, still leaves “make” undefined, which 
results in an imprecise standard.210   
3. The SEC Deserves Some Level of Deference  
Not only did Congress seek to promote market integrity and 
investor confidence with the Exchange Act, it also sought to create an 
independent agency to deal with the specific and complicated problems 
of the securities markets.211  Consequently, in examining the various 
approaches to securities fraud under § 10(b), which the SEC administers, 
                                                 
205 This is also a benefit of the Bright Line test, but the benefit is outweighed by the “safe 
harbor” problem mentioned above. 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 194-204 (discussing the Substantial Participation 
test and the likelihood of decreasing professional involvement). 
207 This would solve the problem created by the Substantial Participation test, which has 
a wide range of activity for which an actor could be liable.  See supra Part III.A (discussing 
the Substantial Participation test). 
208 See supra Part IV. 
209 See supra note 70 (noting the effect of professional involvement on the market). 
210 See supra Part III.C. 
211 Congress gave the SEC enforcement power and interpretation power to deal with the 
securities issues as the agency saw fit.  See Grundfest, supra note 39, at 1018 (noting that 
Congress originally had wanted to delegate authority to the Federal Trade Commission, 
but decided instead to create a new entity). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/7
2006] Secondary Actor Liability Under Rule 10B-5 445 
the SEC’s interpretation should be given some level of deference.212  
However, because the private right of action under § 10(b) is a judicially 
created right, traditional deference likely does not apply.213 Nonetheless, 
the policies and principles behind deference, as well as the purpose and 
history behind the creation of the SEC, suggest that the SEC’s 
interpretation of the right of action under § 10(b) and 10b-5 should be 
given some consideration.214   
As scholars have recognized, regulation of securities is complicated 
and courts have frequently stepped aside to allow the SEC to resolve 
difficult issues of interpretation.215  Further, the courts’ policy in allowing 
such expansive deference was fueled by understanding the value of 
agency expertise and flexibility.216  Similarly, in creating the SEC, 
Congress emphasized the necessity of having an entity with its “single 
concern” being securities regulation.217   
The Creation test, as advocated by the SEC, comports with the 
congressional intent of § 10(b), and also represents the agency’s 
                                                 
212 See supra text accompanying note 42 (discussing judicial deference to administrative 
agencies). 
213 See supra note 42 (discussing Chevron deference).  Since deference generally requires 
legislative intent or congressional delegation of authority, and because the private right of 
action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was judicially created, the SEC’s interpretation of that 
right is not entitled to Chevron deference.  E.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting Chevron deference where the statute is administered 
by the courts); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (finding that a 
congressional delegation of administrative authority is a precondition of deference).  But 
see In re Enron Corporation Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 
2002) (finding that § 10(b) was an expressly delegated rule making authority to the agency, 
which it exercised inter alia in promulgating Rule 10b-5, and as a result, courts should give 
considerable weight to the SEC’s construction of the statute since the SEC’s construction is 
not arbitrary or contrary to the statute).  See also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 
(2002) (noting that the SEC interpretation of the text of § 10(b) should be entitled to 
deference if it is reasonable).  But see Gold, supra note 74, at 691-92.  Gold argues that 
Chevron deference should not apply to the SEC’s interpretation of the scope of conduct 
prohibited by § 10(b) in a private cause of action context, because such deference is based 
on presumed legislative intent.  Id. at 670.  Specifically, because a private right of action 
was not originally part of the statute, but instead was created by courts, Gold argues that 
courts should continue to construe the scope of prohibited conduct.  Id. at 670-71. 
214 See Cope, supra note 42, at 1333 (discussing the rationale behind Chevron deference); 
Facciolo, supra note 42, at 1 (discussing various justifications courts use for deferring to 
agency interpretations. 
215 Facciola, supra note 42, at 1 (noting justifications courts used in giving deference to the 
SEC). 
216 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
217 See Grundfest, supra note 39, at 1018 n.287 (citing courts and scholars who had 
affirmed the SEC’s status as an agency with expertise in matters of securities regulation). 
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interpretation of its own rules and regulations.218  Realizing its own 
limitations in regard to its enforcement efforts, the SEC has emphasized 
the importance of the private right action on many occasions.219  
Additionally, the SEC has an interest in the deterrence of fraudulent acts 
that affect investors, but the “safe harbor” left open by the Bright Line 
test removes that deterrent effect. 220  The SEC is also interested in 
keeping liability tied to public misrepresentations and acts that affect 
public investment.221  As a result, the Substantial Participation test’s 
overreach brings many defendants into the realm of liability under the 
Exchange Act who are beyond the desired scope of SEC power.222  
Because the interests and justifications for the SEC proposed 
interpretation of secondary actor liability are not only reasonable, but 
compelling, the SEC should be given due deference in its preferred 
approach to secondary actor liability.223   
In summary, the appropriate test for secondary liability should 
promote market integrity by encouraging professional involvement and 
discouraging fraudulent schemes and practices.  Additionally, because of 
the SEC’s expertise in regards to the securities markets, the SEC’s choice 
of the Creation test and its analysis of liability under § 10(b) is due 
consideration.  As a result, both the Bright Line and Substantial 
Participation tests fail to adequately preserve these goals of the Securities 
Acts.  The Anixter and Creation tests are better, but still need 
clarification.  
C. Predictability and Certainty:  Comporting with the Goals of Central Bank 
A final analysis of the various approaches to secondary actor liability 
requires an inquiry into whether the goals of Central Bank—predictability 
and certainty—are met by each approach.224  In particular, in Central 
                                                 
218 See Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 588.  See also supra text accompanying notes 143-46 
(discussing the Creation test’s adherence to the legislative purpose of the Exchange Act). 
219 See Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 2.  See also Facciolo, supra note 42, at 87-88 (noting the 
failure of SEC resources to increase comparative to litigation); Frumento, supra note 77, at 
986 n.70 (documenting attempts by the SEC to reiterate the need for a private cause of 
action). 
220 See Klein Brief, supra note 125, at 12 (discussing the harmful effects of the “safe harbor” 
created by the Bright Line approach). 
221 See Securities Exchange Commission, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects 
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec. 
gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept. 3, 2006). 
222 See supra Part III.A (discussing criticisms of the Substantial Participation test). 
223 See supra Part III.D (discussing the Creation test, as applied in Enron and the Klein 
Brief). 
224 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994). 
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Bank, the Court emphasized it wanted to avoid having unpredictable 
legal rules that would risk exposure to increased litigation against 
individuals tangentially involved.225  Additionally, in recent years, 
Congress has sought to discourage frivolous suits while maintaining fair 
rights of action for legitimate claims.226   
First, critics have recognized that the Bright Line test definitively 
offers more certainty than the other two tests regarding secondary actor 
liability.227  By making the unambiguous and clear requirement that a 
statement must be attributed to an actor to find liability, the Bright Line 
test allows attorneys and accountants to clearly gauge what actions will 
create liability.228  However, this same quality that provides 
predictability also creates a loophole for crafty actors:  actors can just 
keep their names out of material misstatements.229  The Bright Line 
approach also keeps out legitimate claims against individuals primarily 
or entirely responsible for the creation of misstatements and 
omissions.230   
In contrast, the Substantial Participation test offers little or no 
compass for determining what level of activity or involvement triggers 
liability for secondary actors.231  For example, the Ninth Circuit has 
formed liability varying from participation in the creation of a document 
to the mere status of a relationship.  The test provides no predictability 
or certainty to actors as to what behavior may trigger liability under the 
                                                 
225 Id.  See also Frumento, supra note 77, at 980 (stating that the Court in Central Bank’s 
concerns were that the liability for aiding and abetting resulted in unpredictable legal rules, 
giving rise to the risk of litigation exposure unrelated to the merits of cases and causing 
inefficiency in capital markets and the economy). 
226 See supra note 83 (describing the various sections of the PSLRA). 
227 See Haskins, supra note 44, at 1107. 
228 See Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Shapiro v. 
Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
229 Consequently, its predictability actually harms the effectiveness of the test.  See supra 
Part III.B (discussing criticisms of the Bright Line test’s “safe harbor”). 
230 Id. 
231 See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks Inc. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding 
accountants liable for playing a “significant role” in the preparation of a client’s misleading 
statement to the SEC); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garett, 871 F. Supp. 
381, 388-89 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (finding defendants liable for drafting and editing); Flecker v. 
Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Civil No. 95-1926-MA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5452, at *9 
(D. Or. Feb. 12, 1997) (finding that the defendants’ roles as analysts, bankers and advisors 
with extensive contacts with the defendants, superior access to inside information, and 
participation in both drafting and decision-making was sufficient to establish primary 
liability). 
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Exchange Act.232  Additionally, the Substantial Participation test reaches 
individuals whose actions had a minimal effect on market integrity; 
consequently, the number of possible suits is indeterminate.233  Such an 
expansive interpretation of the right of action directly contradicts the 
current trend to encourage less litigation.234  Consequently, the 
Substantial Participation test is the worst at reducing litigation.  
Although the Bright Line test is the best at a reduction, it goes too far and 
removes securities fraud litigation away from the purposes of the 
Exchange Act.   
The Creation and Anixter tests offer better predictability and 
certainty than the Bright Line and Substantial Participation tests.  
However, both the Creation and Anixter tests need clarification as to 
what “create” and “make” mean.235  “Create” is unclear as to whether it 
includes preparation and formulization, or invention and 
conceptualization.236  Nonetheless, the possibilities for the Creation and 
Anixter tests, if modified, are much better than those for the Substantial 
Participation and Bright Line tests.   
V.  A PROPOSED STANDARD OF LIABILITY FOR SECONDARY ACTORS 
Although each test proposed by the circuits excels in some aspect, 
each test fails to offer a workable standard for primary liability of 
secondary actors.237  Consequently, the best solution to the problem of 
primary liability left by Central Bank is a fusion of the best aspects of each 
test.   
                                                 
232 See supra Part III.A (discussing the application of the Substantial Participation Test).  
See also Wynne, supra note 84, at 1625 (noting that the Substantial Participation test lacks 
objectivity). 
233 So far, the application of the Substantial Participation standard has ranged from 
allowing recovery against those who merely reviewed documents to those who actively 
participated in its development, creation, and dissemination.  See, e.g., Musick, 871 F. Supp. 
at 388-89. 
234 The enactment of the PSLRA is evidence of Congress’ desire to control the increasing 
trend of litigation in America.  See Fisch, supra note 83, at 1304 (offering a detailed 
discussion of the events and factors leading up to Congress’ passing of the PSLRA). 
235 See Frumento, supra note 77, at 995.  Frumento utilizes strict definitions of the words 
“use,” “make,” and “create” to argue that while “create” and “make” both suggest 
bringing something new into existence, only “make” can be used with “use” (as it is in 
§ 10b) to mean “carry out.”  Id. at 996. 
236 Id. 
237 See supra Part IV. 
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A. What Needs To Be Fixed:  Text of the Proposed Test for Secondary Actor 
Liability  
Using the Creation test as a base format, there are two primary 
changes necessary to make a workable approach to secondary actor 
liability.  First, “create” should be clarified to more adequately describe 
what actions are sufficient to establish liability.  Second, the knowledge 
requirement, as stated in the Anixter test, should be added to enable the 
new test to better serve the reliance requirement under § 10(b).  The 
result of these clarifications and additions is not merely a modified 
Creation test; rather, it is a new unique blend of the best aspects of the 
current approaches.   
1. “Create” Should Be Clarified 
First and foremost, the greatest obstacle to the application of the 
Creation test is the vague and unspecified term “create.”238  If the test is 
to be widely used, the term “create” must be clearly and specifically 
defined.  As noted above, “create” is preferred to “make” because it casts 
a wider net around actors who take part in securities violations.239  
However, if left unclarified, the net could spread far and wide, making 
the Creation test a mere alternative version of the Substantial 
Participation test.240   
As a result, “create” should not mean draft or review.241  Creation 
requires some analytical contribution from the actor;242 the secondary 
actor must put forth some original contribution to the document in order 
                                                 
238 See supra text accompanying note 146 (discussing the vagueness of “create” in the 
Creation test).  The court in Enron tried to clarify the Creation test.  In re Enron Corp. Sec., 
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 610 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  The Enron court held 
that when professionals, including lawyers and accountants, take the affirmative step of 
speaking out, whether individually or as essentially an author or co-author in a statement 
or report, whether identified or not, about their client’s financial condition, have a duty to 
third parties not in privity to not knowingly issue misleading statements on which they 
have reason to expect that third parties will depend.  Id. at 610. 
239 See supra Part III.A (discussing the overbroad application of the Substantial 
Participation test); supra Part III.B (discussing the overly narrow application of the Bright 
Line Approach); supra Part III.C (discussing the possibility that the Creation test, if 
clarified, would allow recovery only against those individuals whose behavior was greater 
than aiding and abetting). 
240 Supra Part IV.C (discussing the Substantial Participation test’s unpredictable 
outcomes). 
241 See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381, 389 (S.D. 
Cal. 1994) (using the Substantial Participation test to find liability for merely drafting and 
reviewing a document). 
242 See infra Part V.A.2 (discussing the need for a knowledge requirement). 
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to be found liable.243  Otherwise, liability for drafting regularly used 
documents is aiding and abetting, which was clearly outlawed in Central 
Bank.244  As a result, the lawyer or accountant or auditor must add or 
include his own thoughts, ideas, understanding, and analysis of the 
information provided to him in order to have a sufficient level of 
participation beyond mere aiding and abetting liability.245   
2. A Knowledge Requirement Should Be Added 
As discussed above, knowledge that a statement would or could go 
public is necessary for any test under § 10(b) to maintain the reliance 
requirement.246  As stated in the Anixter test, the requirement that a 
secondary actor “know or should have known” that the 
misrepresentation or omission would be communicated to investors 
implicates the FOMT and preserves the reliance requirement of 10b-5 by 
preserving the public nature of the statement.247  Furthermore, the 
addition of the knowledge requirement may satisfy some critics who 
believe that attribution is required.248   
B. Text of the Proposed Test 
This Note proposes the following test for secondary actor liability: 
A secondary actor is a primary violator under § 10(b) if he 
creates a material misrepresentation by contributing his own 
original judgments, perceptions, or analysis of facts made 
known to him, while acting with the requisite scienter, even if 
his name was unknown to the public, if he knew or should 
have known that the information could or would be made 
public. 
                                                 
243 See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the need for a clear standard of liability so as to 
encourage professional involvement and promote market integrity); supra Part IV.C.1 
(discussing the need for predictability and certainty as to what actions would open 
professionals to liability under § 10(b)). 
244 See supra Part II.C (discussing the decision in Central Bank). 
245 See infra Part V.B (introducing the text of the Proposed Test). 
246 See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the need for a knowledge requirement in order to 
adequately preserve the reliance requirement under § 10(b)). 
247 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
248 See supra Part III.B (discussing the Bright Line test and the necessity of an attribution 
requirement). 
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First the Proposed Test seeks to clarify the term “create” by listing a non-
exhaustive list of terms that describe behavior that results in creation.249  
Specifically, creation requires that an actor’s “judgments” or 
“perceptions” or “analysis” be “contributed” in order for the actor to be 
found primarily liable.250  These words more clearly emphasize that 
some original input on the actor’s part is required.  As a result, the 
Proposed Test removes possible liability for drafting and reviewing by 
requiring affirmative action on the part of the lawyer, auditor, or 
accountant in the creation of the document.  
Further, the Proposed Test offers the addition of the knowledge 
requirement articulated in the Anixter test.  This enables the Proposed 
Test to more effectively serve the reliance requirement of § 10(b).  Also, 
the addition of such language bridges the gaps between all four of the 
current tests, producing a median approach that is more likely to be 
accepted.   
C. Tenets that the New Test Will Support 
In analyzing the practicality and viability of the Proposed Test, the 
framework of the analysis is the same as the framework used in Part IV 
to compare the current tests.251   
1. The Proposed Test Focuses on the Public Aspects of the Reliance 
Requirement 
As discussed at length earlier, the key to the reliance requirement 
under § 10(b) is the FOMT and the public nature of 
misrepresentations.252  By requiring no attribution, the Proposed Test 
recognizes the underlying assumption that professionals are involved in 
the creation and preparation of statements disseminated to the public.253  
However, by adding a knowledge requirement, the Proposed Test also 
recognizes that it is the public nature of statements that is significant, 
and knowledge that a statement will go public is necessary for the 
reliance requirement.254  The Proposed Test provides a causal link 
between the actor and the misrepresentation by requiring enough action 
                                                 
249 See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing the need for a clearer definition of “create” to avoid 
the problems of the Substantial Participation test). 
250 This avoids the over expansiveness of the Substantial Participation test.  See supra Part 
III.A (discussing the wide variance in application of the Substantial Participation test). 
251 See supra Part IV. 
252 See supra Parts II.A.2–II.A.3. 
253 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
254 See supra Part III.C. 
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on the part of the secondary actor to move beyond aiding and abetting.  
The actor must make some affirmative, unique contribution to the 
misrepresentation.255   
2. Market Integrity Is Protected by the Proposed Test 
Part IV of this Note discussed the need for any rule of primary 
liability to satisfy the goals of the Exchange Act.256  The Proposed Test 
serves to increase market integrity by eliminating the safe harbor left 
open by the Bright Line test.257  Fewer schemes would be likely to 
develop under the Proposed Test because of the removal of the 
attribution requirement--secondary actors will not benefit from 
creatively avoiding having their name disclosed.258  Additionally, the 
Proposed Test more clearly delineates what actions lead to liability, 
thereby encouraging involvement by professionals.259  As a result, there 
would be no chilling effect on professional activity.   
3. The SEC Is Afforded Appropriate Deference  
As noted earlier, the SEC was created in an effort to have a 
specialized program deal with the unique problems of securities law; 
accordingly, the SEC deserves some deference.260  Although the 
Proposed Test does not adopt the SEC’s suggested test in its entirety, the 
Proposed Test acknowledges that the Creation test, with modification, 
has the ability to bridge the gap between the harsh effects of the Bright 
Line and Substantial Participation tests.261  Additionally, the Proposed 
Test keeps the private right of action intact, enabling investors to 
supplement the SEC’s enforcement activity.262  However, the Proposed 
Test departs from the Creation test in two ways.  First, it clarifies 
“create” to make the standard of liability less vague.263  Second, by 
adding the knowledge requirement from Anixter, the Proposed Test 
                                                 
255 See supra Part II.C; supra Part III.A. 
256 See supra Part IV.B. 
257 See supra Part III.B. 
258 See supra Part III.B. 
259 See supra note 70. 
260 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
261 See supra Part III.D. 
262 See Haskins, supra note 44, at 1096 (noting that the SEC lacks the resources to 
“comprehensively police the markets”). 
263 See supra Part V.A.1. 
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decreases the amount of possible litigation just the right amount--not too 
little, not too much.264   
4. The Proposed Test Provides Predictability and Certainty 
Finally, the Proposed Test fosters Central Bank’s goals of 
predictability and certainty.265  By clarifying the use of “create,” the test 
more clearly delineates the type of activity that will lead attorneys, 
auditors, and accountants to be liable under 10b-5.  Also, by more 
explicitly stating that an affirmative action on the part of the secondary 
actor is required, the Proposed Test enables professionals in the field of 
securities to accurately gauge what behavior they may engage in.  As a 
result, the Proposed Test cures many of the defects of the current 
standards, making it a viable alternative to the approach to primary 
liability for secondary actors.266 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although the circuits have battled with the issue for ten years, they 
have failed to reach a consensus as to what should constitute liability in 
the wake of Central Bank.  Where one test succeeds at promoting investor 
confidence or promoting market integrity, that same test fails to preserve 
the reliance requirement under § 10(b).  Where another test preserves the 
reliance requirement, it lacks a clear definition of the standard of 
liability, creating the likelihood that professional involvement in the 
securities process would be chilled.  Consequently, a fusion of the 
currently unworkable standards is necessary. 
The best approach to secondary liability is one in which “make,” as 
used by § 10(b), is more properly defined to indicate that an affirmative 
or positive contribution by a professional is necessary for that person to 
be liable under § 10(b).  Further, a requirement that the individual knew 
or should have known that the misstatement in question would go 
public is necessary to preserve the longstanding reliance requirement of 
§ 10(b).  Drawing from the strengths of each currently used test for 
secondary actor liability, the Proposed Test provides professionals with a 
clearer standard of liability to guide them. 
For example, look back to the facts from the Cascade scandal, 
discussed in Part I.  In Cascade, attorneys made affirmative, glowing 
                                                 
264 See supra Part IV.C.2. 
265 See supra Part V.C. 
266 See supra Part V. 
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public statements that Cascade was in excellent financial health.  Under 
the Proposed Test, those attorneys would be liable because the 
statements they made to the public and distributed to Cascade officers to 
make to the public were unique products created by the attorneys.  It 
would not matter that the statements were prepared by the attorneys 
and made public by the CEO, as long as the attorneys knew or should 
have known that the statements could or would go public. 
Currently, there seems to be no end to the disarray surrounding 
secondary actor liability in the circuits.  Given that four distinct tests 
have emerged within the circuits, it appears that the Supreme Court will 
likely be forced to address the issue soon to provide stability to this area 
of law.  Until then, professionals continue to cautiously navigate through 
the muddled standard of liability under § 10(b). 
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